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ABSTRACT
Climate Change in Rural Nevada: The Influence of Vulnerability on Risk
Perception and Environmental Behavior

by
Ahmad Saleh Safi
Dr. William James Smith, Jr., Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Environmental Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In this research, I examine the impact of vulnerability on risk perception, stated
willingness to adopt individual mitigation behavior, and support for climate change
mitigation policies. My major research question is, “Does vulnerability to climate change
increase risk perception, encourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and
enhance support for climate change mitigation policies?” But to understand the role of
vulnerability I also pursue answers to questions regarding its three components: Physical
vulnerability; sensitivity and adaptive capacity. I investigate the following sub-questions:
•

Do physical vulnerability, and sensitivity to climate change increase risk
perception, encourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and enhance
support for climate change mitigation policies?

•

Does greater adaptive capacity to climate change decrease risk perception,
discourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and weaken support for
climate change mitigation policies?
The research population is Nevada farmers and ranchers. This research is based

on my work for a Nevada NSF EPSCoR project titled, “Nevada Infrastructure for Climate
Change Science, Education and Outreach.” Specifically, my research is a part of the
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activities of the Policy, Decision Making and Outreach project’s component. Within this
project, Nevada ranchers and farmers were surveyed in December 2009 and August 2010
regarding their socioeconomic characteristics and climate change related knowledge,
beliefs, risk perceptions, environmental behaviors and policy preferences.
I utilize the data gathered in that survey in addition to GIS based secondary data
on water availability and use, and population densities in Nevada. Using the GIS based
secondary data, I map Water Resource Vulnerability in Nevada to perform an assessment
of physical vulnerability to climate change. I assess both sensitivity and adaptive capacity
to climate change using the socioeconomic data collected from the survey. Then, I
aggregate the three vulnerability components into a composite vulnerability index unique
to each farmer and rancher. I employ multiple regression analysis to investigate the
influence of the composite vulnerability index, and its three separate components on risk
perceptions. I utilize logistic regression to investigate the influence of the composite
vulnerability index and its components on the willingness to adopt climate change
mitigation individual actions and support for mitigation policies.
The research establishes that vulnerability to climate change is not a significant
factor in determining risk perception or the willingness to engage in, or support most of
the climate change mitigation actions or policies. While vulnerable ranchers and farmers
are more supportive of taking actions mitigating climate change; they are less supportive
of climate change mitigation polices perceived as being costly including taxing
corporations and fuel.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this research, I investigate the influence of physical and socioeconomic
vulnerabilities to climate change on both risk perception and environmental behavior.
This research is interdisciplinary, drawing on the literature of risk analysis,
psychosociology and human geography. The literature lacks studies that investigate the
impact of the aggregated physical and socioeconomic vulnerabilities to climate change on
risk perception, willingness to engage in individual mitigation actions and support of
public mitigation policies (Blake 2001; Messner and Meyer 2006). This dissertation aims
at filling this research gap, and enriching the discourse concerning the determinants of
both risk perception and environmental behaviors within the context of climate change.
This research is a part of the activities of the Policy, Decision Making, and
Outreach Component (hereinafter PDOC) of a National Science Foundation funded
Nevada EPSCoR project, “Nevada Infrastructure for Climate Change Science, Education
and Outreach” (hereinafter the NV NSF Climate Project). This project funded most of my
pursuit of a PhD degree. The Nevada NSF Climate Project is funded by both the National
Science Foundation (NSF) and Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE). The project
is a $21.5 million, 5 year endeavor that started on September 1, 2008. The researchers at
PDOC work with the main groups and stakeholders in Nevada including ranchers and
farmers, Native Americans, students, businesses, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. A research lab named the Climate Change Research Lab
was established in 2009 by Dr. William James Smith Jr. at UNLV to host most of the
researchers and the PDOC research activities.
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In this chapter, I first introduce my research problem, clarifying its importance for the
climate change mitigation policy debate in the U.S. Then, I list my research questions and
place them in the literature. Finally, I provide a summarized overview of the NV NSF
Climate Project.

1.1 Research Problem
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth assessment report
stated that climate change is “unequivocal” (IPCC 2007a); there is abundant evidence
that the global average temperature, including both air and ocean temperatures, is
increasing continuously. Additionally, the report stated that there are indications of
already accelerating snow and ice melting, and sea level rise at the global scale. The
IPCC also reported that the global mean surface temperature has increased by 0.74 ±
0.18oC (1.7 ± 0.3oF) between the years 1906 to 2005. The report stressed the increasing
confidence regarding the anthropogenic causation behind the accelerating climate
changes (very likely, 90-99% probability).
The IPCC (2007a, b) argued that the rise of global temperature interacts with the
complex climate system to produce varied impacts that differ from region to region and
ecosystem to ecosystem. For example, some wet areas are expected to become even
wetter, and thus suffer an increasing flood risk. On the other hand, drought stricken areas
are expected to have more frequent, longer and severer drought occurrences (IPCC
2007b). While water supplies are expected to be enhanced at the high latitudes and the
already-wet tropics, supplies are expected to diminish around the dry regions, midlatitudes and dry tropics. Increased local temperatures at mid to high-latitudes may result
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in slight increase of crop productivity. But, at lower latitudes crop production is projected
to decrease significantly. Increased sea level rise is expected to intensify the risks of
flooding and coastal erosion in many coastal areas.
Increased water stress, severer and more frequent extreme events, decreased crop
production, and raised temperature are all expected to inflict serious health and economic
impacts on many areas around the world (IPCC 2007b). According to the WHO, the
annual climate change death toll has already reached 150,000 deaths in 2000, (WHO
2003; Broome 2008, Miller 2010). A more recent study by the Global Humanitarian
Forum estimated the climate change imposed death in 2009 to be 300,000 (GHF 2009).
Rajan (2006) argued that for the atmospheric concentration of the greenhouse
gases to stabilize at 450 ppm, the U.S. may have to reduce its contemporary emissions by
75% by 2050. According to the IPCC (2007c), stabilizing the atmospheric greenhouse
gases concentration at 445-490 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2-eq) leads to a global mean
temperature rise of 2-2.4oC (3.6-4.3oF) by the end of the 21st century. While, a
concentration of 535-590 ppm CO2-eq leads to a temperature rise of 2.8-3.2oC (5.05.8oF). And, an atmospheric greenhouse gases concentration of 590-710 CO2-eq leads to
global mean temperature increase of 3.2-4oC (5.8-7.2oF).
However, the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions continued to grow from about 4,735
million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1980 to 5,999.90 metric tons in 2007 (U.S.
Energy Information Administration 2009). Figure 1-1 shows that both the transportation
and residential sectors add up to about 61% of the total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.
Rajan (2006) stated that about 75% of the transportation sector emissions result from the
passenger transportation sector, while the remainder results from freight.
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Figure 1-1: 2007, U.S. CO2 emissions per sector in million metric tons.
Source: Created from US. Energy Information Administration 2009.
Note: CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are allocated to the energy consumption
sectors in proportion to each sector share of the total electricity retail sale.

Bandivadekar and Heywood (2004); Evans (2008) argued that in order to
decrease the greenhouse emissions from the transportation sector, citizens need to alter
their vehicle-use habits and support the governmental adoption of more strict fuel
efficiency regulations. For example, Bandivadekar and Heywood (2004) showed that
regulating the vehicles fuel efficiency alone cannot lead to decreased greenhouse
emissions. They stated that the U.S. Congress enacted the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards (CAFÉ) in 1975. This regulation succeeded in increasing the fuel
efficiency of light cars by about 56% between 1973 and 1979. In 1980, this increase of
efficiency stopped at 9.8 L/100km (24mpg) for light cars, and13.7 L/100km (17.2 mpg)
for light trucks. However, this rise in fuel efficiency was overshadowed by the growth of
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car ownership rate (800 vehicles per 1000 people), the upturn of less efficient light trucks
sales (from 18% to 50% in 2004) and the doubling of vehicles kilometer (miles) traveled.
Decreasing emissions from the residential and commercial sectors requires more
voluntary actions from the side of citizens. The IPCC (2007c) reported that the residential
and commercial building sector offers a cost effective greenhouse gases emissions
reduction potential of 30% of the projected 2020 baseline emissions using existing
technologies. These reductions can be attained by a wide spectrum of activities ranging
from no cost energy saving activities such as turning the unnecessary lights off, or using a
thermostat to control the air conditioning temperature, to cost effective installation of
more energy efficient heaters, refrigerators and other house appliances, to utilizing better
designs for effective insulation, solar panels, passive cooling and natural ventilation.
Although awareness of climate change and its impacts has been rising since the
1980s, the U.S. public support of mitigation strategies perceived as being costly has
continued to be limited (Leiserowitz 2003; Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf
2009). In 1989, only 70% of Americans believed that climate change was a serious issue,
while in 2003, this percentage rose to 92% (Leiserowitz 2003). However, O’Conner,
Bord and Fisher (1999) reported that by the end of the 20th century, a good majority of
Americans were willing to choose more fuel efficient cars (63%), and replace energy
wasteful appliances (75%), but a moderate majority (55%) were willing to support
governmental legislation that add taxes on extremely inefficient automobiles (gas
guzzlers). Only a small minority (18%) were willing to support taxing gasoline or taxing
businesses (38%). In 2008, Leiserowitz, Maibach and Roser-Renouf (2009) reported a
similar trend; only 33% of Americans supported taxing gasoline. But, a good majority
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supported less costly policies such as increasing vehicles fuel efficiency to 45 mpg
(79%), subsidizing energy efficient appliances (72%), and increasing use of renewable
energy by electric utilities (72%). And, a vast majority (92%) supported increasing of the
governmental funding to research on renewable energy resources.
In the last two years, some regression in the public’s belief in climate change as
an anthropogenic problem, as well as a decrease in the evaluation of its risk have been
noticed. For example, in 2010, only 57% of the American adults believed climate change
is happening, in comparison to 71% in 2008. And, only 53% believed that climate change
has an anthropogenic trigger (completely or partially) in 2010, compared to 62% in 2008.
Additionally, the percentage of Americans who think that the people in the U.S. are being
harmed now by climate change decreased from 34% in 2008 to 25% in 2010, while the
percentage of Americans who think that the U.S. will never be harmed increased from
15% in 2008 to 23% in 2010 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 2010).
While the impacts of climate change continue to reveal themselves over time, the
need for the U.S citizens to significantly reduce their greenhouse gases emissions
becomes greater. Such reduction imposes the need for serious changes in the citizens’
energy use habits coupled with effective public climate change mitigation policies.
Accordingly, understanding the determinants of climate change related risk perception
and environmental behavior among the U.S. citizens is crucial for productive
communication among citizens, scientists, and policy makers on the way to
comprehensive climate change mitigation plans. Tremendous research has been
conducted to investigate the determinants of risk perception and environmental behavior
within the context of climate change. My research adds to this work by investigating the
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impact of vulnerability to climate change on both risk perception and environmental
behavior. As a part of the Nevada NSF Climate Project, this research endeavors to
provide both the policy makers and the climate change scientists with knowledge that
will assist them in engaging in more effective communication and interaction in the
“public sphere” on the way towards informed and educated public decisions regarding
climate change mitigation (Habermas 1989).

1.2 Research Questions
My research examines whether vulnerability to climate change affects
individuals’ perceptions regarding the impacts of climate change, decisions to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as their support of public policies intended to mitigate
climate change. Specifically, I evaluate how differences in individual vulnerabilities to
the risk of climate change induced drought among Nevada ranchers and farmers influence
their risk perceptions willingness to adopt and/or accept individual mitigation actions
and/or support public mitigation policies.
1.2.1 Key Definitions
In this subsection, I introduce some of the most important concepts utilized in this
research. These definitions help develop a common understanding of the major
components of this research, and avoid possible confusion with other interpretations of
these terms or concepts. In this research I use the definition of vulnerability stated by the
IPCC (2001, p. 995) which is:
…the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with,
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and
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extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its
adaptive capacity (IPCC 2001, p. 995).

Sensitivity is a measure of the extent to which a system can be harmed or benefit
by a given hazard; whereas, adaptive capacity reflects the capacity of a system to
mitigate, survive, adjust, take advantage of, and adapt to environmental hazards (Fussel
and Klein 2006; Smit and Wandal 2006; Metzger, Leemans and Schroter 2005; Gallopin
2006).
Risk perception pertains to the lay persons’ appreciation (ranking) of the
probability and magnitude of certain hazards on certain groups such as oneself, family, or
community (Slovic et al. 1982; Fischhof 1995; Sjoberg 2000). It also relates to the lay
persons’ perception regarding the imminence of given risks.
Environmental behavior is identified as any behavior that impacts the
environment (Stern 2000). Stern et al. (1999) classified environmental behaviors into
three categories: 1) Environmental activism; 2) Non-activist behaviors in the public
sphere; and 3) Private-sphere environmentalism. Environmental activism includes
involvement in environmental organizations or participation in pro-environmental
activities such as demonstrations and campaigning. Non-activist behaviors in the public
sphere include supporting environmental policies, petitioning and willingness to pay
higher taxes for the sake of the environment. Private sphere environmentalism includes
engaging in activities at the personal level that have positive impact on the environment,
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such as recycling, conserving water and energy, and purchasing environmental friendly
goods.
1.2.2 Questions
This interdisciplinary research project draws on the literature of three knowledge
domains including vulnerability, risk perception, and environmental behavior, all of
which intersect with climate change policy discourse. More specifically, this research
focuses on non-activist behaviors both in the public and private spheres. The research
adds to the literature investigating the impact of vulnerability on risk perceptions and
environmental behavior. In this research, I assess vulnerability as a composite factor of
the following components: 1) Physical vulnerability; 2) sensitivity; and 3) adaptive
capacity of Nevada farmers and ranchers. Then, I investigate the impact of vulnerability
on ranchers’ and farmers’ climate change risk perception, decisions to engage in proenvironmental individual actions or support climate change public policies. I also
investigate the impacts of the three components of vulnerability as independent
determinants of Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perceptions and environmental
behaviors. My research questions are:
1.

2.

Does vulnerability increase risk perception?
a.

Does physical vulnerability increase risk perception?

b.

Does sensitivity increase risk perception?

c.

Does higher adaptive capacity decrease risk perception?

Does vulnerability lead to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions?
a.

Does physical vulnerability lead to willingness to adopt individual actions?

b.

Does sensitivity lead to willingness to adopt individual actions?
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c.

Does higher adaptive capacity decrease willingness to adopt mitigation

actions?
3.

Does vulnerability lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies?
a.

Does physical vulnerability lead to supporting public mitigation policies?

b.

Does sensitivity lead to supporting public mitigation policies?

c.

Does adaptive capacity decrease supporting public mitigation policies?

1.2.3 Place in the Literature
Within the context of climate change, few studies have focused on the
interrelationships between vulnerability, risk perception, willingness to engage in
individual mitigation actions and support of public mitigation policies (Blake 2001;
Messner and Meyer 2006). Satterfield, Mertz and Slovic (2004) argued that the lack of
focus on investigating the interrelationship between vulnerability, risk perception, and
environmental behavior results from the disparity between the disciplines within which
these research domains exist. In this research I bridge this gap through investigating the
interaction of vulnerability and its three components with both risk perception and
environmental behavior. The study of vulnerability is prominent within the disciplines of
geography and environmental sciences, whereas risk perception and environmental
behavior research are prominent within the disciplines of risk analysis and social
psychology (Blake 2001; Messner and Meyer 2006).
Brody et al. (2008) investigated the impacts of different physical vulnerabilities
on climate change risk perception. The researchers found that those who live closer to the
coastline and at lower elevations perceived the risk of climate change higher than those
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who live at higher elevations or farther from the coastline. People living in areas with
higher natural-hazards-imposed fatalities also perceive climate change risk higher than
those living in less exposed areas. On the other side of the spectrum, people who live
within the 100-year flood plain perceived climate change perceive lower than those who
live in safer areas. People living in areas witnessing increasing wildfires or number of
days exceeding average temperature or higher natural hazards economic losses perceive
climate change the same as others.
Working with the same sample as in Brody et al. (2008), Zahran et al. (2006)
investigated the influence of physical vulnerability to climate change impacts on
willingness to assume costlier mitigation policies. The authors reached mixed
conclusions. They found that people living in areas experiencing significant increase in
the summer temperature or higher natural hazard causality are more supportive to climate
change mitigation policies. But, those people who live closer to the coastline (1 mile
radius), thus more susceptible to the risk of inundation are less willing to support climate
change mitigation policies.
As can be seen above, only a limited number of studies investigated the impact of
vulnerability on risk perception especially in relation to climate change. Even this limited
number of studies investigated vulnerability, focusing only on the physical vulnerability
component and neglecting the interaction between the physical vulnerability and the
socioeconomic conditions of exposed individuals that determine their final vulnerability
to climate change impacts. Investigating the physical component in vulnerability alone
may lead to incomplete appreciation of the impact of vulnerability on either climate
change related risk perception or environmental behavior. For example, in the case of
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those who are living close to the coastline the number of houses owned by every resident,
her/his income, number of months spent at the beach house, and reasons behind living
near the coast provide important insights on those people perceptions and opinions in
relation to climate change. Additionally, if the beach residents believed that discussing
climate change affect the value of their property, they may find the whole climate change
discussion to be a threat to their investments and economic interests.
This research enriches such discussion and widens the focus of assessing
vulnerability to include both social vulnerability (sensitivity and adaptive capacity) and
physical vulnerability. Additionally, this study utilizes a different strategy; instead of
studying a sample representing the general population, this research focuses on one group
(ranchers and farmers) that shares common interests and challenges in regard to climate
change impacts. Using this strategy eliminates or limits the impact of variation among
individuals regarding the importance and value of the same natural resource or hazard of
concern. Also, studying the impact of vulnerability and its component allows for better
understanding of how each component of vulnerability behaves within the context of
climate change risk perception and environmental behavior and how they interact with
each other to formulate the overarching influence of vulnerability on determining
peoples’ risk perception and behavior.

1.3 Nevada NSF Climate Project’s Overview
This research is nested within the activities of the Policy Decision Making and
Outreach Component of the Nevada NSF Climate Project. The Nevada NSF Climate
Project aims at building the science, education and outreach infrastructure for the study of
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climate change among NSHE universities and colleges, including the University of
Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV), University of Nevada-Reno (UNR), Desert Research
Institute (DRI), and Nevada State Colleges (NSC) (NSF EPSCoR 2008).
The NV NSF Climate Project encompasses six components: Policy, Decision
Making and Outreach; Climate Modeling; Ecological Change; Water Resources; Cyberinfrastructure; and Education (Figure 1-2). The goal of the Policy, Decision Making and
Outreach component is to “develop data collection, modeling and visualization tools to
better understand institutional and societal aspects of climate change and perform
outreach to translate and communicate this [climate change] science” (NSF EPSCoR
2008, p.10). The Climate Modeling component works on downscaling global climate
models to assess the regional climate variability in Nevada with higher resolution and
over shorter time periods. The Ecological Change component is investigating and
modeling climate change impacts on the major ecosystems and echo-hydrologic
processes in Nevada. The Water Resources component is quantitatively assessing and
modeling the interaction between climate change and Nevada water cycles and resources.
The Cyber-infrastructure component is assisting all the other components through
providing and maintaining the computing, storage and visualization infrastructure. The
Education component is focusing on building the needed infrastructure for educating and
training k-12 teachers and NSHE undergraduate students as climate change teachers and
researchers (NSF EPSCoR 2008).
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Figure 1-2: The structure of the NV NSF Climate Project.
Source: The NV NSF Climate Project team.

The Policy, Decision Making and Outreach component (PDOC) is working on
achieving three main objectives. The first objective is to research the climate change
related knowledge, perceptions, and policy preferences among different Nevada
communities, groups and stakeholders: Ranchers and farmers; Native Americans;
university students; small businesses; and governmental and nongovernmental
stakeholders (NSF EPSCoR 2008). The second objective is to perform outreach with the
above listed groups in a way that enhances opportunities for two-way communication
between the NV NSF Climate Project scientists and Nevada communities and
stakeholders. The last objective is to develop visualization and media tools and messages
that allow effective communication between the different climate change stakeholders
and decision makers in Nevada.
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To enhance two-way communications between the NV NSF Climate Project’s
researchers and Nevada communities and stakeholders, a Social Science Climate Change
Network (SSCCN) was formed. The network consists of the project’s social scientists
from the three NSHE institutions (UNLV, UNR and DRI) and a Stakeholder Advisory
Committee (SAC). The basic role of the SAC is to address varying sub-community
priorities and feedbacks while discussing scientific questions and research results. The
SAC concept is also helpful in providing the understanding of the scientific approaches
needed for effective communication of the Nevada NSF Climate Project outputs to the
stakeholders (NSF EPSCOR 2008).
The outcomes of the research activities of the PDOC, regarding the determinants
of Nevadans climate change knowledge, risk perception and policy support will be
utilized as guidelines for proper communication of climate change project outputs of both
a science and social science nature to Nevada policy makers, and stakeholders. The NV
NSF Climate Project will make its data available through a climate change data portal,
and visualization cyber-infrastructure that taps the GIS and Remote sensing facilities of
the NSHE universities. Additionally the PDOC will produce videos and new media on
climate change in Nevada in both English and Spanish suitable for the general public
awareness and knowledge building. In the last year of the project (2012), PDOC will
organize a national conference on climate change and policy with an emphasis on arid
environment using research from the NV NSF Climate Project and research throughout
the U.S. (NSF EPSCoR 2008).
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CHAPTER 2
STATE OF LITERATURE
My research draws heavily on literature from three main research areas: 1) Risk
perception, 2) environmental behavior and 3) vulnerability. Throughout this chapter, I
provide a review of the literature on risk perception, environmental behavior, and
vulnerability within the context of climate change. Firstly, I provide a review on the
evolution of the concept of vulnerability to natural and technical hazards. Then, I
summarize the literature on the determinants of risk perception and environmental
behavior within the context of climate change.

2.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change
In my research I adopt vulnerability to climate change as a function of three main
components: 1) physical vulnerability; 2) sensitivity; and 3) adaptive capacity. While
physical vulnerability (P.V.) of a particular system (community, individuals) is
determined by the probability and severity of certain hazards (natural or technological)
affecting this system, both sensitivity and adaptive capacity are determined by the
socioeconomic conditions of the threatened communities or individuals (Turner et al.
2003; Cutter 2003; Adger 2006; IPCC 2007b, Smith Jr. 2008).
Researchers from different knowledge domains have been involved in a
discourse on what constitutes vulnerability to hazards since at least the 1960s. Within this
discourse, vulnerability evolved from being centered on the probability and severity of
hazards to take place (physical vulnerability) and became an umbrella concept in which
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both physical vulnerability and the socioeconomic conditions of the threatened individual
or communities are linked.
The discussion concerning vulnerability has been taking place within different
knowledge domains resulting in three different definitions, attributes and focal questions
(Table 2.1). Janssen (2007) conducted a bibliometric analysis of 3,399 publications
issued between 1967 and 2007 on three knowledge domains: Vulnerability (1,534
studies); adaptation (1,033 studies); and resilience (1,559). Some publications were
classified into more than one knowledge domain. The research revealed that while the
ecological resilience knowledge domain is rooted in ecology and mathematics, the
vulnerability and adaptation domains are rooted in geography and natural hazards
research. Janssen found that the research activity in the three domains increased
substantially after 1992 as a result of the extensive research on climate change impacts on
both the ecological and human systems. The researchers also established that the
connection between vulnerability and adaptation knowledge domains on one side, and the
resilience knowledge domain on another continued to be weak till recently in terms of coauthorship and citations.
Cutter (1996), Eakin and Luers (2006) and Fussel (2007) argued that even within
the geography and natural hazards research, there are two separate approaches to define
and assess vulnerability especially within the context of climate change. As can be seen
in Table 2-1, the first approach is the risk hazard approach mostly used by engineers and
economists. This approach focuses on predicting the physical impacts of climate change
on the physical environment and the human systems. The other approach is the political
economy approach, which focuses on the ability of humans as individuals or
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communities to avoid, cope with, and adapt to hazards that threaten their livelihood and
wellbeing.

Table 2-1: The Three Conceptual Lineages of Contemporary Vulnerability Research.
Point of
Comparison
Focal Questions

Key Attributes

Exposure Unit

Decision Scale of
Assessment
Selected Definitions

Risk/Hazard
What are hazards?
What are the
impacts?
Where and when?

Exposure (physical
threat, external to
systems), Se
Places, sectors,
activities, landscapes,
regions.
Regional, global
“ .. the likelihood that
an individual or a
group will be
exposed to and
adversely affected by
a hazard. It is the
interaction of the
hazards place with
the social profile of
communities”(Cutter
1996 p. 532)
“.. the idea of
potential for negative
consequences which
are difficult to
ameliorate through
adaptive measures
given the range of
possible climate
changes that might
reasonably occur”
IPCC, 2001, P 774)

Political Economy

Ecological Resilience

How are people and places
affected differently?
What explains differential
capacities to cope and
adapt?
What are the causes and
consequences of
differential susceptibility?
Capacity, households,
social groups,
communities, livelihoods
Individuals, households,
social groups,
communities, livelihoods
Local Regional, global

What and how do
systems change?
What is the capacity to
respond to change?
What are the
underlying processes
that control the ability
to cope or adapt?
Ecosystem, coupled
human environmental
systems
Ecosystems, coupled
human-environmental
systems
Landscape, ecoregions,
multiplescales
Vulnerability defines
as the opposite of
resilience, where
resilience is “the
capacity of a system to
undergo disturbance
and maintain its
functions and
controls.” (Gunderson
and Holling 2002;
Carpenter et al. 2001,
p. 766).

“ The characteristic of a
person or persons in term
of their capacity to
anticipate, cope with,
resist and recover from the
impact of natural hazards”
(Blaikie, Cannon, Davis
and Wisner 1994, p 9)
“Vulnerability comes at
the confluence of
underdevelopment, social
and economic marginality,
and the inability to garner
sufficient resources to
maintain the naturalresource base and to cope
with the climatological
and ecological instabilities
of semi-arid zones.”
(Ribot, Najam and Watson
1996, p .28)

Source: Adopted from Eakin and Luers (2006, p.368).
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“ Resilience has the
following three
properties: a) the
amount of change a
system can undergo; b)
the degree to which the
system is capable of
self-organization; c)
the degree to which the
system can build the
capacity to learn and
adapt” (Carpenter, et
al. 2001, p. 766)

The few studies that investigated the impact of vulnerability on risk perception
and environmental behavior within the context of climate change adopted the risk hazard
approach focusing on the physical impacts of climate change without considering the
socioeconomic conditions of threatened communities. Adger (1999); Kelly and Adger
(2000) argued that the study of physical vulnerability alone deals with natural hazards
such as the impacts of climate change as if they happen in vacuum. They further argued
that when natural hazards affect a group of people, they interact with the socioeconomic
conditions of those people. This either enhances and deepens their vulnerability, or
decreases the impacts of the natural hazards and strengthens these people’s adaptive
capacity. Kelly and Adger’s (2000) understanding of vulnerability assessment applies
what they called the “wounded soldier” approach. The wounded soldier approach focuses
on assessing the impact of the existing conditions (injury) on the capacity of systems
(individuals or groups) to avoid, cope with and adapt to expected hazards or risks.
Bohle, Downing and Watts (1994); Adger and Kelly (1999) argued that the
interaction between natural hazards as external factors and the socioeconomic conditions
of the affected human systems is based on the “architecture of entitlement.” The
architecture of entitlement is a theory developed within the research on famine insecurity.
They explained that, the resources available for any human system (individuals,
communities, sectors, and nations), and the entitlement of the members of those human
systems to such resources determine the ability of those systems to survive and adapt to
external stresses and hazards. Entitlement in this sense is not limited to the availability of
resources such as income and wealth, but it extends to include culture, efficiency of
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informal institutions, effectiveness of formal institutions, and distribution of political
power that determine the accessibility to resources at the time of stress.
Currently, a growing body of literature integrates the physical vulnerability or
exposure to hazards and risks, and the socioeconomic conditions or the social
vulnerability within an overarching vulnerability definition (Turner et al. 2003; Cutter
2003; Adger 2006; IPCC 2007b, Smith Jr. 2008). The IPCC (2001 p. 995) defined
vulnerability to climate change as:
…the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with,
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its Sensitivity, and its
Adaptive Capacity.

2.1.1 Sensitivity
Sensitivity (hereinafter Se) is a measure of the extent to which a system can be
harmed or benefit by a given hazard. In this sense, Se denotes those characteristics of a
system that govern the outputs of its interaction with a given hazard when it takes place.
For example, characteristics such as age determine Se to heat waves as children and
elderly are more sensitive than youth. In other cases, the level of reliance on natural
resources such as water and forests determines communities’ and individuals’ Se to
certain climate change impacts such as drought, soil erosion, and wildfires. For example,
those communities which depend more on agriculture for their economic wellbeing are
more sensitive to climate change impacts such as drought and crop production decrease
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than communities with more diverse economies (Scheraga and Grambsch 1998;
Kasperson and Kasperson 2001; Fussel and Klein 2006; O’Brien et al. 2006).
Consequently, For Nevada farmers and ranchers diversification of income is an
important factor of determining the sensitivity of their livelihood to drought as those who
are less reliant on agriculture as a source of income are less sensitive to drought than
others. Additionally, those farmers and ranchers who diversify their agricultural income
more through practicing more than one agricultural activity (ranching, farming,
beekeeping, aquaculture, etc.) are less sensitive than those who practice only one activity.
Practicing more than one agricultural activity provide choices for the agricultural
practitioner at times of exposure to drought, unavailable for those who rely completely on
one activity. Also, diversification of crops and domestic animals is another factor of
importance when it comes to farmers’ and ranchers’ Se to climate change imposed
drought, as those with higher crop and animal diversification are in better state to survive
severe drought conditions, for example, by giving up these crops or animals with higher
water demand, than those who are reliant on only few crops or domestic animals for their
agricultural income.
2.1.2 Adaptive capacity
Adaptive capacity (hereinafter Ad.C.) is a measure of the capacity of a system to
respond to a given environmental hazard by mitigation, coping, survival, adjustment, or
adaptation. In this sense, Ad.C. relates to the notion of the architecture of entitlement
discussed above by Bohle, Downing, and Watts (1994); Adger and Kelly (1999). Ad.C.
reflects the resources available to the system under investigation (community,
individuals, etc) and the accessibility to these resources when risks take place. Individuals
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with higher income, higher education and better social status are usually more able to
protect themselves from or adapt to hazards than those with less resources and political
connections. At the community level, factors such as wealth, availability of resources,
efficiency of governmental and nongovernmental institutions, education of citizens
(human capital), and ability of the community members to gather their resources and
respond collectively to hazards (social capital) are all decisive regarding the capacity of
communities to avoid, cope with and adapt to hazards and changes (Yohe and Tol 2002;
Fussel and Klein 2006; Smit and Wandal 2006; Metzger, Leemans and Schroter 2005;
Gallopin 2006; Barnett and Adger 2007).
Adger (2005; 2003; 2000; 1999); Kelly and Adger (2001) stressed that even
though the individual and social vulnerabilities at the community, society or national
scales are intrinsically linked, they still have distinct natures. They also stressed the
improperness of aggregating individual vulnerabilities as assessment of collective
vulnerability. They argued that at the individual level vulnerability is a function of
relative poverty, social status, diversity of income, and reliance on natural resources for
livelihood. As can be seen in Table 2-2, Cutter, Boruff and Shirely (2003) added gender,
ethnicity, age, household ownership, family size and health status as important factors of
individual vulnerability. In addition to the aggregated individual vulnerability indicators
stated before, societal vulnerability encompasses the status of available infrastructure and
technologies, informal social reciprocity and solidarity norms (social capital), the
governmental and nongovernmental institutions efficiency, the market structure, and the
status of formal social security arrangements (i.e. insurance).
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Table 2-2: Individual and Societal Socioeconomic Vulnerability Matrix.
General
Factors
Poverty

Individual Vulnerability

Social Status

Dependence
on Natural
Resources
Diversity of
Income
Age
Gender

Race and
Ethnicity
House
Ownership
Infrastructure
and
Technologies
Social
Capital

Societal Vulnerability

Institutional
Capacity
Market
Structure
Population
Growth
Medical
Services
Special
Needs
populations
Insurance

Water
Accessibility

Description
Richer individuals are usually more capable to absorb hazards
impacts than poorer persons (poverty is a function of income and
dependency ration).
Those who enjoy higher social status are more resilient because
they are entitled to more individual and social resources that enable
them avoid, adopt and recover faster from hazards impacts. Social
status is a function of income, occupations and education.
Those individuals who are dependent on natural resources for their
livelihood such as fishermen, hunters, gatherers and farmers are
usually more vulnerable to natural hazards.
People with more than one source of income are less sensitive to
absorbing livelihood threatening shocks than those with one source
of income.
Elderly and children are usually more vulnerable to extremes such
as floods, storms, and heat waves.
Women usually have a slower recovery time than men because of
their family care responsibilities, unjust working conditions and
stricter constraints on mobility and responses to hazards.
Minorities usually have less power and more difficulty to accessing
post-disaster help. Also they usually live in more hazardous areas.
Those who rent are either transient or poor, which limit their
knowledge about aid sources at the time of emergencies. Also they
tend to lack sufficient shelter when lodging becomes uninhabitable
The value, quality and density of domestic infrastructure and
technologies that predict, prevent and/or alleviate possible impacts,
or fasten recovery
The stronger the cultural norms of reciprocity and solidarity in a
certain community, the more resilient that community is to natural
hazards, and the faster its (the community) post-hazard recovery is.
The more efficient the institutions the more able they are to predict,
mitigate and adapt to natural hazards and help affected
communities recover from hazards.
The value, quality and density of commercial and industrial
activities determine the societal economic health and thus its level
of resilience to natural hazards.
Fast population growth put societies under huge stress, providing
the needed infrastructure and service networks, thus makes such
societies unable to absorb external natural shocks.
The quantity and quality of health institutions are very decisive to
the capacity of societies to mitigate, and deal with natural extremes
such as floods, heat waves, epidemics, etc.
The more special needs groups such as peoples with disabilities,
chronically diseased, homeless and transient peoples are in a
community, the more sensitive that community is to natural
hazards because of the invisibility of those groups during recovery.
Countries with more effective, widespread insurance policies are
more capable to pool the cost of natural hazards and thus coping
with them.
The percentage of household connected to the water network, the
amount of water stored at any point of time, the percentage of
population dependent on natural water resources, the percentage of
population without consistent water supply in a community are all
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Category
(Se/Ad.C.)
Ad.C.

Ad.C.

Se

Se

Se
Se

Se
Se

Ad.C.

Ad.C.

Ad.C.

Ad.C.

Se

Ad.C.

Se

Ad.C.

Se

decisive to the capacity of that community to deal with
emergencies such as storms, earthquakes and tornados.
Food
Crops diversity, dependence on family farms or natural resources
Se
Accessibility for food, and the availability of food affect communities’ capacity
to deal with droughts and natural extremes.
Sources: Cutter, Boruff and Shirley (2003); Kelly and Adger (2000); Adger (2005, 2003, 2000, 1999);
Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009).

In contrast to previous research that focused on the impact of P.V. to climate
change on risk perception and individual behavior, my research study vulnerability as an
integrated function of P.V., Se and Ad.C. I use variations in water stress in Nevada as a
proxy for the physical vulnerability component (see the methodology chapter). I use the
level of reliance on agricultural income for livelihood (the share of agricultural income/
the total family income) as an indicator of Se to drought among the ranchers and farmers.
I use both the relative poverty and social status indices as proxies to Ad.C. Finally, I use
all these indices to develop a vulnerability index for Nevada ranchers and farmers based
on the work of Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009).

2.2 Climate Change: Risk Perception and Environmental Behavior
Stern (2000) provided a framework for understanding pro-environmental
behaviors. He classified the motives behind such behaviors into four categories (Table 23):1) Attitudinal; 2) contextual; 3) personal capacity; and 4) habitual. Attitudinal motives
include values, beliefs, and ecological worldviews. Moreover, attitudinal motives
includes beliefs about oneself such as the perception of oneself as responsible of the
environmental issue of concern (perceived responsibility), or the perception of oneself as
being able to induce change (perceived self-efficacy).
Contextual motives include two subcategories: The interpersonal influences and
physical context. Interpersonal influences include community expectations, governmental
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policies, social networks, and other legal commitments. Physical contexts include costs
and benefits of environmental behaviors, and appropriateness of existing regulations,
infrastructure and technologies. Personal capacity attributes include knowledge regarding
the environmental issue of concern, and personal attributes such age, gender, education,
and income. Finally, the habitual motives category includes interactions between
environmental behaviors and people’s routines.

Table 2-3: Determinants of Environmental Behavior.
Category of Motives
Attitudinal Motives

Components

Definitions

Values

The values people attach to targets such as oneself, people
and community, and the environment. People usually assign
values to all those targets but in different proportions.
“Conviction that certain things are true.”( Agnes and Laird
2002, p.55) These Convictions entail almost everything
starting from oneself, others, God, society, governance,
science, environment, etc.
This component includes both perceived self-efficacy and
self-responsibility. Perceived self-responsibility implies the
person’s belief that she/he is responsible for the issue of
concern; whereas, perceived self-efficacy denotes the
perception of oneself as capable of averting the
environmental hazard of concern.
A special substructure of beliefs concerned mainly with the
relationships between human beings and their environment
as ecosystems or species. Environmental beliefs encompass
but are not limited to the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP),
Human Exceptionalism Paradigm, or the Dominant
Western Worldview.
Community expectations, social norms, governmental
policies, social networks, and other legal commitments.
The physical environment including natural and human
made structures, technologies and infrastructure.
The awareness regarding the environmental issues of
concern in terms of its causes and impacts on humans and
ecosystems.
Education, income, age, gender, race, and place of living.

Beliefs

Beliefs about
oneself

Ecological
worldviews

Contextual Motives

Personal Capacity

Interpersonal
influences
Physical
contexts
Knowledge

Demographic
Variables
Habitual Motives

People routinely do certain behaviors that impact the
environment such as transportation use and smoking.
Sources: Dietz (1994); Schwartz (1977); Rajarz (1999); Agnes and Laird (2002); Gardner and Stern
(1996); Stern 2000; Steg, Derijerink and Abrahamse (2005); Abrahamse et al. (2005); Biel and
Thogerson (2007).
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Stern (2000) provided the ABC Theory to describe the interrelationships between
the different categories of motives described above. The ABC Theory postulates that the
attitudinal variables (A) including both values and beliefs interact with contextual
conditions (C) to formulate environmental behaviors (B). As can be seen in Figure 2-1,
the theory suggests that values (biospherism, egoism and altruism) impact the adoption of
environmental beliefs regarding nature and its interaction with human. In turn,
environmental beliefs affect peoples’ awareness of the adverse impacts of environmental
problems such as air pollution, climate change, etc. This awareness interacts with the
perceived self-efficacy or self-responsibility to determine the intention to conduct
aforementioned pro-environmental behaviors (pro-environmental norms). Moreover, the
theory specifies that the translation of this intention into an environmental behavior is
mediated by contextual conditions that either facilitate or suppress pro-environmental
actions.

Figure 2-1: A schematic presentation of the ABC theory.
Source: Created from Stern et al. (1999); Stern (2000).
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2.2.1 Attitudinal Motives
Stern and Dietz (1994) identified three types of values related to the discussion on
risk perception and environmental behavior: 1) Egoistic; 2) altruistic; and 3) biospheric
values. Egoistic values make people interested in those risks that impact them personally,
whereas altruistic values make people interested in those risks that impact their families,
communities and societies. On the other hand, biospheric values make people concerned
about risks that impact nature, animals and ecosystems. The three values exist in all
human beings, but to varying degrees. Consequently, people with stronger egoistic
orientation tend to engage in environmental behaviors that benefit them directly, and
oppose others if the personal cost is high; whereas, people with stronger altruistic
orientation would engage in environmental behaviors that avert risks threatening their
families, communities and societies. People with stronger biospheric orientation would
engage in environmental behaviors if the given environmental problem threatens nature,
its ecosystem and species (Stern and Dietz 1994).
Kahan et al. (2007) argued that the variance among individuals and groups in
relation to risk perceptions results from a “motivated cognition” which people utilize to
defend their identity, and societal roles, taking the shape of conflicting worldviews.
Motivated cognition refers to the tendency of people to distort facts, serving their beliefs
and worldviews or “believing what they want to believe” (Jost et al. 2003 p. 340). The
authors employed the Douglas (1970) “group grid” typology to describe the distribution
of people over four conflicting worldviews.
The “group” dimension separates people into individualists and communitarians.
Individualists believe that individuals should stand for themselves and be competitive,
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while communitarians believe that individuals depend, protect and help one another in
the form of communal solidarity. The other dimension is the “grid” dimension which
separates people into hierarchists and egalitarians. Hierachists believe that the
distribution of “resources, opportunities, respect, and the like” should follow certain
classification based on traits such as gender, race, kinship, and career; whereas,
egalitarians value the right of any person or group to participate in any social role they
select. According to the group grid typology, individuals or groups can be categorized
into: Hierarchists individualists, hierarchists communitarians, egalitarians individualists,
and egalitarians communitarians.
Political orientations (democrats versus republicans), political orientations
(conservatism versus liberalism), beliefs regarding the magnitude of the governmental
role in managing the national economy (small role or libertarianism versus wider role),
and views regarding property rights are all important factors in determining peoples
appreciation of environmental risk and the need for taking action averting such risks
(Leiserowtiz 2006, 2005, 2003; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999, Dietz, Dan, and
Shwom 2007, Slimak and Dietz 2006). Based on their cultural theory of risk perception,
Wildavesky and Dake (1990) argued that even though democrats (often liberals) usually
perceive risk higher than republicans (often conservatives), the differences between the
two groups stem from different worldviews or cultural biases upheld by the followers of
the two parties, not from conflict of interests or struggle for offices. The authors further
asserted that republicans are usually individualists and hierarchists; whereas, democrats
are usually egalitarians, but not necessary communitarians. Egalitarians tend to perceive
technological and environmental risks as grave and serious, while hierarchists and
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individualists tend to perceive technological risks as low and technological benefits as
high. In the results chapter there I discuss how political orientation impacts ranchers’ and
farmers’ climate change rick perception end environmental behavior.
Guagnano, Dietz and Stern (1995) theorized that the influence of values on
environmental behavior is mediated by general environmental beliefs and worldviews.
These environmental worldviews are usually represented by convictions regarding the
relationship between humans and nature. Cotton and Dunlap (1980) identified three
contradicting general environmental paradigms depicting the relationship between
humans and their environment. The first paradigm is the “new ecological paradigm”
(NEP). As can be seen in table 2-4, the new ecological paradigm implies that earth is a
finite biophysical environment; hence, it is fragile and vulnerable to human actions and
growth. In contrast, the dominant western worldviews (DWW) implies that the world is
vast, unlimited and largely unsusceptible to human actions and growth. The human
exemptionalism paradigm (HEP) implies that humans are masters of their destiny as their
ingenuity and accumulated culture emancipate them from the powers of nature and allow
them to design their destiny regardless of the state of their physical environment (Buttel
1987). According to the believers in the human exceptionalism paradigm, discussion of
the impact of human on nature or vice versa is irrelevant because humans have the
“ultimate resource” within themselves (Simon 1996).
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Table 2-4: The Three Major Environmental Worldviews.
Dominant Western
Worldview (DWW)
Assumptions
about Nature of
Human Beings

People are
fundamentally
different from all other
creatures on Earth,
over which they have
domination

Human
Excemptionalism
Paradigm (HEP)
Humans have cultural
heritage in addition to
(and distinct from) their
genetic inheritance, and
thus are quite unlike all
other animal species

Assumptions
about Social
Causation

People are masters of
their destiny; they can
choose their goals and
learn to whatever is
necessary

Social and cultural
factors (including
technology) are the
major determinants of
human affairs.

Assumptions
about the Context
of Human Society

The world is vast, and
thus provides
unlimited
opportunities for
humans

New Ecological Paradigm
(NEP)
While humans have
exceptional characteristics
(culture, technology, etc.),
they remain one among
many species that are
interdependently involved in
the global ecosystem.
Human affairs are
influenced not only by
social and cultural factors,
but also by intricate linkage
of causes, effects, and
feedbacks from the web of
nature; thus purposive
human actions have
unintended consequences.
Humans live in and are
dependent upon a finite
biophysical environment
which imposes potent
physical and biological
restraints on human affairs.

Social and cultural
environments are the
crucial context for
human affairs, and the
biophysical
environment is largely
irrelevant.
Assumptions
The history of
Culture is cumulative;
Although the inventiveness
about Constraints
humanity is one of
thus technological and
of humans and the powers
on Human Society progress; for every
social progress can
derived therefrom may seem
for a while to extend
problem there is a
continue indefinitely,
carrying capacity limits,
solution, and thus
making all social
progress need never
problems ultimately
ecological laws cannot be
soluble.
repealed.
cease.
Source: Adapted from Buttel (1987), based on Cotton and Dunlap (1980).

Many studies found that individuals who are more biospherists, altruists, liberal,
democrats, egalitarians, and (NEP) endorsers are generally more concerned about the
impacts of climate change and more supportive of climate change policies and actions
than those who are more conservative, republicans, hierarchists, individualists, and NEP
opponents (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; Leiserowtiz 2006, 2005, 2003; Slimak and
Dietz 2006; Dietz, Dan and Shwom 2007).
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Risk perception itself is an important factor in determining environmental
behavior, especially within the context of climate change. Many studies showed that
perceiving the risk of climate changes as temporally close (immediate or within few
years) and/or spatially close (affecting one’s community, region or country) and/or
impacting oneself and family result in more willingness to engage in climate change
aversion individual practices and enhances the willingness to support climate change
mitigation policies (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; O’Connor et al. 2002; Bord, Fisher
and O’Connor 1998; Leiserowitz 2006, 2005, 2003, Semenza, Hall et al. 2008).
Within the same category, Kllestedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) found that
perceived responsibility toward climate change results in higher climate change risk
perception and more willingness to support climate change mitigation policies or adopt
climate change mitigation individual actions. They showed that perceived self-efficacy
(perceived capability of causing change or imposing impact on the progress of certain
problem or issue) sometimes results in more support for climate change policies. But,
some other times it results in more trust in the capacity of technology and scientists to
mitigate climate change in the future and thus defeats the need for supporting perceived
costly climate change mitigation policies.
In my research, I use political orientations, views regarding the role of the
government, and property rights of Nevada ranchers and farmers as a measure of their
general beliefs and worldviews. I limited myself to those indicators because those
worldviews are usually interrelated and related to other beliefs and orientations such as
“group gird” typology or environmental beliefs as explained above. As can be seen in the
methodology chapter, I also investigate the impact of climate change specific beliefs on
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risk perception and environmental behavior. Specifically, I investigate the impacts of
beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change and beliefs regarding the
possible causal connections between the contemporary drought in Nevada and climate
change on ranchers’ and farmers’ attitudes toward climate change and its mitigation
actions.
2.2.2 Personal Capacity Motives
Within the personal capacity category, numerous studies concluded that
knowledge of climate change causes and impacts influences both risk perception and
willingness to support and/or adopt climate change mitigation policies and individual
actions (Jaeger et al. 1993; O’Conner, Bord and Fisher 1999; Bord, O’Connor, and Fisher
2000; O’Connor et al. 2002). However, different studies reached conflicting findings
regarding the influence of demographic attributes such as gender, age, income and race
on supporting climate change mitigation policies (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999;
O’Connor et al. 2002; Sunblad, Biel and Galing 2007; Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz
2008; Semenzaet al. 2008).
Many U.S. citizens have misconceptions about climate change causes and
impacts. Numerous Americans think that climate change is caused by air pollution,
deforestation, chlorofluorocarbon emissions (the cause of Ozone Layer degradation), or
“agitated weather” disturbed by actions such as atomic bombs and space shots. Ample
numbers of Americans simplify the impacts of climate change to having hotter summers,
or mix climate change impacts with the Ozone depletion impacts such as skin cancer
(Bostrom et al. 1994; Seacrest, Kuzelka, and Leonard 2000; Leiserowitz, Smith, and
Jennifer 2010).
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Many studies have established that those who have more accurate knowledge
regarding the causes and impacts of climate change perceive the risk of climate change to
be higher than those who have confused knowledge on climate change. For example,
Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007) found that Swedish individuals with better knowledge
regarding the causes and impacts of climate change perceive both the probability of
climate change occurrence and the risks of its consequences to be higher than others who
mention incorrect reasons for climate change or unaware of its impacts. Bord, O’Conner,
and Fisher (2000) found that Americans who have more accurate knowledge regarding
climate change tend to perceive the risk of climate change as personally and socially
more threatening than others. Bord, O’Conner, and Fisher (2000) added that even when
controlling for risk perception, knowledge continued to be a strong predictor of climate
change mitigation policy support (Jaeger et al. 1993; O’Conner, Bord and Fisher 1999;
Bord, O’Connor, and Fisher 2000; O’Connor et al. 2002). As can be seen in the results
and discussion chapters, I study how beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of
climate change influence risk perception and environmental behavior.
But, research on the impact of demographic attributes on climate change risk
perception and environmental behaviors reached mixed findings (table 2-5). For example,
Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007) found that women are more concerned than men
regarding the impact of climate change. On the other hand, O’Connor et al. (2002) found
that gender, age, and income are not significantly related to supporting climate change
mitigation policies, whereas education is. However, O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999)
found that males, older and more educated persons are more accepting of costly climate
change policies. Leiserowitz (2006) found that females and non-whites are more willing
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to take actions or support policies in order to mitigate climate change. Whereas, Semenza
et al. (2008) found that the more educated and younger people are, the more willing to
engage in pro-environmental behavior addressing climate change they are. They also
found that gender and ethnicity have no significant impact on pre-environmental behavior
related to climate change. On the other hand, Dietz, Dan and Shwom (2007) found that
African Americans and older people tend to be more supportive to costlier climate
change policies and actions. In this research, I investigate the impact of age and gender
on ranchers’ and farmers’ attitude toward climate change.

Table 2-5. Examples of Variations Considering the Influence of Demographic Variables
on Risk Perception and Environmental Behavior.
Publication
Sunblad, Biel and Galing
(2007)

Research
Population
621 Swedish

Leiserowitz 2006

673 Americans

Semenza et al. (2008)

1202
respondents in
Portland OR and
Houston TX
623 central
Pennsylvanians

O’Connor et al. ( 2002)

O’Connor, Bord, and
Fisher (1999)

723 Americans
723 Americans

Leiserowitz (2006)

673 Americans

Semenza et al. (2008)

1202
respondents from
Portland RO, and
Houston TX
316 respondents
in Michigan and
Virginia

Dietz, Dan and Shwom
(2007)

Significant
Determinants
Female(+)

Female (+),
non-white (+)
Females (+),
Poorer (+)

Younger (+),
education (+)
Education (+)
Female (+),
education (+)
Education (+)
Female (+),
non-white (+),
education (+)
Younger (+),
education (+)

Older (+), nonwhite (+)
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Non-significant
Determinants
Education,
parenting, age,
level of
urbanization
Education
Race, education

Gender, income
Gender, age,
income
Age,
Age, gender

Independen
t Variable
Risk
perception

Risk
perception
Risk
perception

Individual
actions
Environmen
tal behavior
Individual
actions
Policy
support
Policy
support

Gender, race,

Individual
actions

Education,
gender, income

Policy
support

I argue that some of the reasons behind the above mentioned inconsistent findings
stem from the poor framing of the relationships between risk perception, environmental
behavior and demographic characteristics. In my research, I frame these characteristics
as indicators or proxies of socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change. I argue that
these characteristics are not influential by themselves, but by the way they impact
individuals’ vulnerability to climate change. I argue that the more certain characteristics
affect individuals’ Se or Ad.C. to climate change, the more they impact individuals’ risk
perception and environmental behavior decisions. In this research, I investigate the
impact of some demographic characteristics on attitude toward climate change not as
independent factors but within the framework of vulnerability. In my research I map
water stress in Nevada by zip code as indicator of P.V. to climate change imposed
drought. I also use demographic characteristic such as marital status, education, income,
source of income, and family size to create indices of ranchers’ and farmers’ Se and
Ad.C. Additionally, in my statistical analysis I still use gender and age in my analyses’
models.
2.2.3 Contextual Motives
People’s connections and social networks determine to a great extent their attitude
toward climate change (interpersonal influences). Cialdini and Trost (1998, p.152) stated
that, “social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group,
and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws.” Biel and
Thogerson (2007) argued that social norms determine the costs and benefits (i.e.
becoming environmental hero or an environmental geek) of environmental behaviors.
When a behavior is a part of the social norms of a society, people within that society will
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cooperate and pool resources to bear the cost. But, when an environmental behavior is not
a part of the social norms, those who choose to conduct it bear the cost of it alone.
Jaeger et al. (1993) found that Americans who are members of a social network
(networking) favoring environmental action or are a part of a community favoring
environmental action have a better chance in engaging in efforts that mitigate climate
change. Jones, Botetzaglas, and Malesios (2009); Lubel, Zahran and Vedltiz (2007)
partially supported this argument by illustrating that Americans living in communities
with richer social capital and higher civic engagement (higher sense of community and
reciprocity) have better chances to engage in climate change activism.
Whitemarsh (2009) studied the impact of the physical conditions on British
citizens’ environmental behavior in relation to climate change. The study investigated the
difference between willingness to conduct environmental behavior (intention) and
actually engaging in environmental behavior (reality) in Hampshire, England. The study
found that only 41% and 36.4% of the respondents turned the unnecessary lights off or
purchased energy efficient bulbs respectively. But, 72.2% and 46.75% of those did that
to save money. Only, 14.2% of the respondents walked or cycled to work because of
environmental related concerns, whereas 38.3% did that to improve their health. Only
6.9% of the respondents used public transportation to protect the environment, but 28%
used it because of convenience. However, 10.1% of the respondents were engaged in proenvironmental campaigns because of their environmental concern, while other causes
such as saving money or protecting personal health were the motives behind minute
participation in pro-environmental campaigns.
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When generally speaking of hazards, living in a more hurricane prone or air
polluted places results in higher perception of risks, and higher support for individual or
public interventions, research on climate change reached mixed findings regarding the
impact of P.V. to climate change on risk perception, willingness to engage in fuel
conservation behavior or support climate change mitigation policy (Elliot et al. 1999;
Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar 2002; Peacock, Brody and Highfield 200; Brody et al. 2008;
Zahran el al. 2006).
Brody et al. (2008) illustrated that those Americans who live closer to the
coastline and at lower elevations perceive the risk of climate change to be higher than
those who live away from the coastline or/and at higher elevations, but those who live in
flood stricken areas (living in a 100 year flood plain) perceive the risk of climate change
lower than those who live in safer areas. On the other hand, living in areas with an
increasing number of wildfires, or increasing temperatures does not impact people’s risk
perception.
When it comes to climate change mitigation policy support, Zahran et al. (2006)
found that Americans living in areas experiencing a significant increase in temperature or
higher natural hazard causality are more supportive to climate change mitigation policies.
But, people living at the beach (1 mile radius), thus more susceptible to the risk of
inundation, are less willing to support policies averting the risk of climate change.
In Britain, Whitmarsh (2008) studied the impact of physical conditions on the
formulation of the willingness to conduct environmental behavior. She found that among
the population of Southern England, those who personally suffered from air pollution
(health problems) or experienced floods in the last 5 years perceive climate change as a
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personal risk more than others. Also, those who have air pollution health related
problems believe more in the anthropogenic responsibility for climate change than those
who experienced floods and the rest of the population. But, both air pollution and flood
victims are not significantly more willing to take actions that mitigate climate change.
Trying to understand such mixed results, the researcher interviewed the flood victims in a
qualitative manner. She found that flood victims perceive climate change and floods as
two different threats. Flood victims blame the improper infrastructure such as blocked
ditches and drains, roads, and local development as the reasons behind flooding more
than the changing weather conditions. Additionally, the flood victims are more
supportive to immediate adaptation actions that mitigate the impacts of flooding, instead
of long term climate change mitigation measures.
As can be seen above, there is only a limited number of studies investigating the
impact of vulnerability to climate change on risk perception and environmental behavior.
This limited number dealt with vulnerability as part of the physical contexts focusing
only on certain physical vulnerabilities and neglecting the interaction between such risks
and the socioeconomic conditions of exposed individuals that determines their Se and
Ad.C. Accordingly, my research hopes to fill this gap in the literature through
investigating the impact of vulnerability as function of the P.V., Se and Ad.C. on risk
perception and environmental behavior related to climate change. I also investigate if
believing in climate change as a cause of the impact of concern (In this research the
impact is water stress and drought in Nevada) affects public attitude toward climate
change.
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2.2.4 Habitual Motives
Duhlstrand and Biel (1997) argued that habits affect human behaviors in a similar
manner to contextual conditions. They stipulated that environmental behaviors that are
rooted in individuals’ habits are usually easier to adopt. However, behaviors which
require habitual changes impose the need for extreme value and belief changes.
Duhlstrand and Biel (1997) explained that moving from an old habit (freezing routine) to
a new one passes through different stages. The first stage is questioning the current habit
in terms of its negative impacts either on oneself, society or environment. The second
stage is finding an alternative behavior that replaces the old habit’s benefits. The third
stage is then evaluating the new behavior in terms of its convenience and advantages. The
final stage is then fixing the new behavior as a new habit.
Aarts, Verplanken and Knippenberg (1997) found that university students who are
accustomed to daily car use are less impacted by the provision of information on climate
change and less willing to use public transportation than those who have weaker habit of
car use. Whereas, Fujii and Kitamura (2003) established that one month free bus tickets
resulted in a sustainable increase in the use of public transportation among 23 habitual
drivers in comparison to a control group of 20 drivers.

2.2.5 Emotional Motives
In addition to the four categories of motives listed by Stern (2000), recent
research established a strong impact of the feelings people assign to climate change and
their risk perception and environmental behavior. Leiserowitz (2003, 2006) found that the
spontaneous association of climate change with images or words (the affect imagery)
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highly impacts people’s attitudes toward climate change risk. He found that those who
spontaneously associate climate change with images or words of devastation,
catastrophes, and floods perceive climate change risks higher than those who associate it
with images and words of polar ice melting and heat, higher than those who associate
climate change to conspiracy, and junk science. In a recent study, Smith and Leiserowitz
(2010) found that the discrete emotions people associate with climate change have the
biggest impact on their risk perception and policy preferences. They found that the
feelings of fear, interest and worry impact peoples climate change risk perception;
whereas, the feelings of interest, helpfulness, disgust and worry determines peoples
support for climate change mitigation policies. Feelings alone explain 60% of the
variance in people risk perception and policy support.
Studying the impact of habits and emotions on climate change risk perception and
environmental behavior is out of the scope of my research. However, as can be seen in
the above section, there are a very limited number of studies that paid attention to these
categories, and thus there is a clear need for research that covers those areas.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES
I hypothesize that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms of P.V., Se,
and Ad.C. increases individuals’ perception of climate change risk. It also enhances
individuals’ willingness to accept climate change mitigation individual measures and
public policies. I use Nevada farmers and ranchers as a target group to investigate the
impact of individual vulnerability on climate change risk perception and environmental
behavior. I also investigate the impact of the three vulnerability components on risk
perception and environmental behavior (individual action and public policy support)
separately. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:
1.

2.

With respect to climate change, vulnerability increases risk perception
a.

P.V. increases risk perception.

b.

Se increases risk perception.

c.

Ad.C. decreases risk perception

With respect to climate change, vulnerability leads to willingness to adopt
individual mitigation actions.

3.

a.

P.V. leads to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions.

b.

Se leads to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions.

c.

Ad.C. decreases willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions.

With respect to climate change, vulnerability leads to supporting mitigation
policies.
a. P.V. leads to supporting mitigation policies.
b. Se leads to supporting mitigation policies.
c. Ad.C. decreases supporting mitigation policies.
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3.1 Support from the Climate Change Literature
Even though few studies have investigated the impact of vulnerability to climate
change, they provide important insight on the validity of my hypotheses. The work of
Whitmarsh (2008) Brody et al. (2008) and Zahran, et al. (2006) studied the impact of a
set of physical vulnerabilities on risk perception and environmental behaviors both in
Britain and the U.S. The studies reached mixed findings as some physical vulnerabilities
increase risk perception and the willingness to mitigate climate change, others are neutral
and others are even decrease risk perception and the willingness to mitigate climate
change. Such results may stem from the focus on P.V. and neglecting the other two
components which are Se and Ad.C. Those two other components may enhance the role
of vulnerability towards playing a bigger role in increasing people’s concerns regarding
the impacts of climate change and thus their support to climate change policies or actions.

3.2 Support from Literature on Other Environmental Risks
More support for my hypotheses comes from the research on risk perception and
environmental behavior, though in contexts different from climate change. As can be
seen below, many studies have shown a strong impact of actual vulnerability to
environmental hazards on the risk perception and the willingness to mitigate those
hazards. For example, Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) investigated the impact of
different levels of pollution on the risk perceptions of residents of three different middleeastern cities (Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv). The authors illustrated that because of
different socioeconomic conditions, the cities have different levels of air, water and
sewage pollutions. Haifa is the most heavily polluted city, Tel-Aviv is in the middle and
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Jerusalem is the least polluted one. The researchers found that the residents of Jerusalem
have the lowest risk perception in regard to air pollution, water quality, noise levels, dirt
and garbage nuisance, and smells and congestion, the residents of Tel-Aviv were second,
whereas the residents of Haifa have the highest risk perception.
In a similar study Elliot et al. (1999) found that the actual level of air pollution to
be a strong determinant of risk perception regarding air pollution among the residents of
Hamilton Ontario, Canada. In Florida, Peacock, Brody and Highfield (2005) found that
the people who live in more hurricane prone locations perceive the risk of hurricanes to
be higher than those who live in safer areas. Brody Peck and Highfield (2005) found that
the proximity of Texas residents to highly polluted areas determines their perception of
air pollution risk.
From the literature on environmental behavior, Blake (2001) established that
people living in different areas of British Colombia perceive the risks associated with
their local environments to be higher than other risks. He found that people living in areas
with more extensive forest and lumber-extracting activities, thus more exposed to
industrial emissions and natural resources exploitation, to be more concerned about those
risks than the city center dwellers who are more concerned about auto pollution.
Additionally, he found that people who live near the extracting industries were more
supportive to individual political actions such as financial donations for the sake of the
environment or protesting against industrial pollutions. But, the same people were less
supportive for governmental intervention that might harm their local economy being
based on those industries.
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Moreover, the literature on the impact of race on risk perception adds another line
of support to my hypotheses. The literature shows that non-whites usually perceive
environmental risk higher than white males (white male effect) (Flynn, Slovic and Mertz
1994; Slovic 1999; Finucane et al. 2000; Satterfield, Mertz and Slovic 2004). Such higher
perception of risk stems partially from the fact that non-whites generally live in areas
with disproportionate environmental pollution and risk hazards including air pollution,
hazardous waste risks, and water pollution (Satterfield, Mertz and Slavic 2004; Pulido
2000; Vaughan 1993; Bulard 1993, Mohai and Bryant, 1992). Because of their
vulnerability, Mohai and Bryant (1998) found that nonwhite individuals show greater
environmental concerns regarding local problems such as air pollution, and waste
management but are less concerned regarding other issues of global scale such as
deforestation and biodiversity. Consequently, the literature on race and risk perception
shows some connection between vulnerability (being poorer, less empowered and living
in riskier areas) and risk perception.
The literature on the history of the environmental grassroots movements in the
U.S. qualitatively supports my hypotheses. For example; Dunlap and Mertig (1992) and
Bullard (1993) described the emergence of local grassroots movements. The grassroots
movements composed mainly of minorities, against industrial pollution in the 1960 and
1970s struggling for stricter environmental standards (air and water quality) to protect the
health of themselves and their children. In this sense, the grassroots movements were
direct responses of the increased vulnerability of impoverished minorities suffering
disproportionate environmental degradation towards a cleaner environment. The fact that
the grassroots movements were created in the poorest and most impacted parts within the
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U.S. cities reflect the strong connection between being vulnerable to risks and acting to
mitigate such risks. This connection may extend to climate change and climate change
impacts as I hypothesize above.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
Within this research project, I am examining the impact of vulnerability to climate
change on Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perception and support for mitigation
strategies both at the public policy and the individual levels. Within this chapter, I first
present my research group and site in relation to climate change impacts. Then I outline
my research questions and alternative hypotheses followed by an explanation of the
empirical models I use to test my different hypotheses. Later, I discuss the statistical tests
I use. Finally, I explain the independent and the dependent variables and measures of this
research.

4.1 Study Group and Site
Rural Nevadans, including ranchers and farmers represent a natural target group
for my research, because they are one of the most vulnerable groups among Nevada
residents as a result of their intensive reliance on scarce water resources for their
livelihoods. Also, their intimate relations with natural resources make their climate
change related risk perceptions and policy views very important. Additionally, Nevada
ranchers and farmers are important stakeholders in any discussion about water rights and
resources reallocation expected to take place as a result of both the extended droughts and
the increasing urbanization (CIER 2008).
Climate change is already occurring in the Western United States. According to
the 2009 report of the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and
Kim et al. (2002), the average surface temperature in the U.S. West is projected to
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increase by 2.2oC (4oF) by 2030 and 4.5-6oC (8-11oF) by the end of the century.
USGCRP (2009) also expected winter precipitation to increase, summer precipitation to
decrease and snowpack to decrease, negatively impacting the rivers’ runoff in the region.
According to CIER (2008), by 2100, Nevada is projected to witness a temperature
rise of 1.7-2.2oC (3-4oF) in the spring and fall seasons, and of 2.8-3.3oC (5-6.4oF) in the
summer and winter seasons. Additionally, CIER (2008) expected Nevada winter
precipitation to increase, and summer precipitation to decrease. Some of the most
important climate change impacts on Nevada will originate in other states. The
temperature increase in the U.S. West may result in decreasing the snowpack feeding the
Colorado River system, the main source of water for Southern Nevada (Piechota et al.
2004; Leung et al. 2004; Miller and Piechota 2008; Karla et al. 2008). Nevada is already
facing a severe drought dating back to the end of last century (Piechota et al. 2004). The
Southern Nevada Water Authority (2007, p. 13) described the average five-year water
flow of Colorado River over the period 2000-2004 as the “lowest five-year average flow
since record keeping began in 1906.” Barnettt and Pierce (2008) and Barnettt et al. (2004)
expected the annual Colorado River flow to decrease by 10-30% over the next 30-50
years.
The Colorado River is the major source of water for Lake Mead Reservoir which
serves two million people in the Las Vegas metropolitan alone in addition to some of
residents of Southern California, Arizona, and Northern Mexico. The reservoir also
generates hydropower for 1.3 million people. Nevada share of the hydropower is 20.7%,
whereas Arizona consumes 20% and California consumes the remaining 59.3% (USDI
2010; CIER 2008). The continuous decrease of Lake Mead water level threatens its
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capacity to meet both water and electricity demands in Nevada and the other
Southwestern states.
CIER (2008) showed that climate change may impose serious stresses on the
major economic sectors including tourism, construction and agriculture. For example,
CIER expected Nevada to have increasing difficulty sustaining its billions of dollars
profit from outdoor activities including water sports at Lake Mead; wildlife watching;
hiking; fishing; and playing golf. It is worth mentioning that Lake Mead alone produces 1
billion dollars in profit from water sports (CIER 2008). The agricultural sector is
expected to experience some gains in growing crops because of the increased winter
precipitation, but to suffer greater losses because of the extended drought. Moreover,
farmers and ranchers are likely to suffer increased pressure and manipulation to surrender
their water rights to meet increasing urban and industrial demands.
Within this research, I study how this vulnerability impacts ranchers’ and farmers’
risk perception and environmental behavior decision about climate change. Specifically, I
study how drought stress varies in Nevada, and then I investigate how such variable
stresses interact with variable socioeconomic conditions of Nevada ranchers and farmers
to presumably formulate different risk perceptions and climate change mitigation
preferences.

4.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Within this research, three sets of hypotheses are tested: 1) Risk perception; 2)
acceptance of climate change mitigation policies; and 3) willingness to adopt climate
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change mitigation individual actions. The Research questions and their alternative
hypotheses are listed below:
Risk perception with respect to climate change
1. Does vulnerability increase climate change risk perception?
H0: ß1= 0
Ha: ß1>0
Where: ß1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability
a.

Does P.V. increase risk perception?
H0: ß11 = 0
Ha: ß11>0
Where: ß11is the Coefficient of P.V.

b.

Does Se increase risk perception?
H0: ß12 = 0
Ha: ß12 > 0
Where: ß12 is the Coefficient of Se

c.

Does Ad.C. decrease risk perception?
H0: ß13 = 0
Ha: ß13 < 0
Where: ß13 is the Coefficient of Ad.C.

Individual behavior with respect to climate change
2. Does vulnerability lead to increased willingness to engage in climate change
mitigation actions?
H0: C1= 0
Ha: C1 >0
Where: C1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability
a.

Does P.V. lead to willingness to engage in mitigation actions
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H0: C11= 0
Ha: C11>0
Where: C11is the Coefficient of P.V.
b.

Does Se lead to willingness to engage in mitigation actions?
H0: C12= 0
Ha: C12>0
Where: C12is the Coefficient of Se

c.

Does Ad.C. decrease willingness to engage in mitigation actions?
H0: C13= 0
Ha: C13<0
Where: C13is the Coefficient of Ad.C.

Public Policy Support with respect to climate change
3. Does vulnerability lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies?
H0: D1= 0
Ha: D1 >0
Where: D1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability
a. Does P.V. lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies?
H0: D11 = 0
Ha: D11 >0
Where: D11 is the Coefficient of P.V.
b. Does Se lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies?
H0: D12 = 0
Ha: D12 > 0
Where: D12 is the Coefficient of Se
c. Does Ad.C. decrease supporting climate change mitigation policies?
H0: D13 = 0
Ha: D13 < 0
Where: D13 is the Coefficient of Ad.C.
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4.3 Empirical Models
4.3.1 Risk Perception Models
For Hypothesis 1the model is
RP = ß0 + ß1 L.V.I. + ß2 A + ß3G + ß4 Po.O.+ ß5 CC.B.+ ß6 D.B.

Where, RP is climate change risk perception that reflects the respondents’
appreciation for the seriousness of climate change impacts on the respondents
themselves, their families, their communities, the U.S., modern countries, least wealthy
countries, future generations, and the world plants and animals (question 35, Appendix
1); ß0 is the intercept; LVI denotes vulnerability measured as a Livelihood Vulnerability
Index which is a composite index of P.V., Se and Ad.C. (Hahn, Riederer and Foster
2009). A is for age, and G is for gender. Po.O. means political orientations (conservative
or not); and CC.B. denotes beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change.
D.B. denotes beliefs regarding the connection between climate change and the
contemporary drought in Nevada.

For Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, the model is
RP = ß0 + ß11 P.V. + ß12 Se + ß13 Ad.C. + ß2 A + ß3G + ß4 Po.O.+ ß5 CC.B.+ ß6 D.B.

Where, P.V. is for physical vulnerability measured through determining the Water
Resource Vulnerability index (WRV) by zip code; Se is Sensitivity to climate change
measured through determining the respondents reliance on the climate change sensitive
ranching and farming for livelihood; Ad.C. is adaptive capacity measured by estimating
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the social status index (income, education and marital status) of the respondents. A, G,
Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. denote the same meaning as in the previous model.
4.3.2 Individual Behavior Models
For Hypothesis 2, the model is
Logit (IB) = C0 + C1 L.V.I. + C2 A + C3 G + C4 Po.O.+ C5 C.H.B+ C6 D.B.

Where, IB denotes willingness to adopt climate change mitigation individual
behaviors ranging from doing nothing to using public transportation more (see Appendix
1, question 38) ; C0 is the intercept; L.V.I., A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as
under in the Risk Perception subsection.

For Hypotheses 2a.2b, and 2c, the model is
Logit (IB) = C0 + C11 P.V. + C12 Se +C13 Ad.C.+ C2 A + C3 G + C4 Po.O.+ C5 CC.B.+ C6
D.B.
Where, A is for age, G for gender, P.O. for political orientation, CC.B. for beliefs
regarding climate change causes and D.B. is for beliefs regarding the possible causal
relationship between drought and climate change in Nevada.
4.3.3 Mitigation Policy Models
For Hypothesis 3, the model is
Logit (SPP) = D0 + D1 L.V.I. + D2 A + D3 G + D4 Po.O.+ D5 CC.B.+ D6 D.B.

Where, SPP is the willingness to support climate change mitigation public
policies ranging from doing nothing to imposing taxes on citizens (see Appendix 1,
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question 39); D0 is the intercept L.V.I., A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as in
the subsections above.

For Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, the model is
Logit (SPP) = D0 + D11 P.V. + D12 Se + D13 Ad.C. + D2 A + D3 G + D4 Po.O.+ D5
C.H.B+ D6 D.B.
Where, SPP, D0, A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as in the model for
Hypothesis 3.

4.4 Statistical Analyses Methods
I analyzed the research data using a two-step strategy. Firstly, I conducted three
sets of bivariate correlation tests. The first set is for the risk perceptions by risk targets
among themselves and variables that include age, gender, political orientations, beliefs
about climate change causes, beliefs about possible connections between Nevada drought
and climate change, in addition to vulnerability, P.V., Se and Ad.C. to climate change.
The second set of correlation tests is for the willingness to engage in a set of
climate change mitigation individual actions among themselves and the same set of
variables mentioned in the case of risk perception. The third set of correlation tests is for
the willingness to support a list of climate change mitigation policies among themselves
and the same list of variables tested for in the previous two sets of tests.
Secondly, I conducted three sets of regressions analyses as will be detailed in the
following sections. Correlation tests do not establish relationships between independent
and dependent variables, yet they show linear associations between variables in one to
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one basis. Correlations tests help discover possible multicollinearity between the
independent variables and thus help avoid the use of highly correlated variables in
regression models (Moore, McCabe and Craig 2009).
4.4.1 Risk Perception Hypotheses Testing.
The hypotheses regarding climate change risk perception were tested using
multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis investigates the impact of
multiple explanatory variables on a single independent response variable (Moore,
McCabe and Craig 2009). Multiple regression analysis uses the method of ordinary least
square (O.L.S) to draw the best fit regression line through minimizing the sum of all the
squared deviations of the distances of all the points to the line (Moore, McCabe and Craig
2009). Multiple regression analysis helps estimate the regression parameters that
determine the change in the response variable with the change of each explanatory
variable. It also helps investigate the significance of the causal relationships (hypotheses
testing) between the explanatory variables and the response variable. One last important
benefit of using multiple regression analysis is estimating the amount of the response
variable predicted by the different explanatory variables in the regression model of
concern (Moore, McCabe and Craig 2009).
There are seven assumptions underlying the use of Classical linear Regression
model (CLR) adopted by the multiple regression statistical test. These assumptions are
essential to any meaningful use of this model in investigating any scientific issue.
Violating such assumption may result in serious impacts on the results and thus the value
of these results (Kennedy 2009). These assumptions are:
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1-

The first assumption is that the regression model is linear in parameters (Bs),
but not necessarily in variables. That is for any model, the relationship
between the dependent variable (Y) and the coefficients of the explanatory
variables (Xs) is of linear nature; whereas, the relationship with the
explanatory variables themselves may or may not be linear as in the case of
(Log X) or X2 (Gujarati, and Porter 2009);
2-

The second assumption is that the expected value for disturbances, or
residuals or errors is zero and so the mean of the distribution of such
residuals is drawn to zero for any given value of Xi;

3-

The third assumption is that X values are fixed. However in many social
sciences data on both the explanatory variables and the independent variable
are collected randomly and so they are stochastic variables (Gujarati and
Porter 2009). When the X variables are stochastic the assumption necessary
for the CLR (or more accurately the New-Classical Linear Regression model)
to apply is that the X variable and the error term are independent from each
other;

4-

The fourth assumption is that the variance of Y(ui) is constant regardless of
the value of X (Homoscedasticity);

5-

The fifth assumption is that the error values are not auto-correlated with one
another;

6-

The sixth assumption is that the number of observations is greater than the
number of parameters to be estimated and explanatory variables to be
investigated; and
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7-

The last assumption is that X variable has more than one value because the
same value of X cannot establish any evidence against or with the linear
relationship between Xs and Y.

4.4.2 Individual Behavior and Mitigation Policy Hypotheses Testing
For every individual behavior or public policy choice, I ran logistic regressions
utilizing the models listed above. In the case of individual behaviors and public policies,
the dependent variables are dichotomous as the answer for every choice is either yes or
no. Even though, a binary variable can be presented quantitatively in a binary form with
the numbers zero and one, it cannot be analyzed using multiple regression tests (Pampel
2000; Peng and Harry 2002).
Using OLS regression for analyzing a dichotomous dependent variable suffers
from two different types of problems, conceptual and statistical. The conceptual problems
stem from the fact that while linear regression can be extended toward positive and
negative infinity, the value of the independent variable is a probability limited between 0
and 1. Accordingly, using ordinary least square regression will result in one coefficient
for every independent variable that is assumed to be the same regardless of the value of X
(the independent variable), where in reality with dichotomous variables the impact of the
changes of X in the middle region is much bigger than those changes that take place near
the 0 and 1 limits (Pampel 2000).
Moreover, linear regression assumes additivity, as the linear regression assumes
that the impact of an independent variable stays the same regardless of changes in the
other independent variables. With dichotomous dependent variables, the effect of
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independent variables is sensitive to changes in other independent variables especially
close to the 0 and 1 limits of probability. The ceiling 1 and the floor 0 make the influence
of the independent variables inherently non-additive and interactive (Pampel 2000).
Statistically, the fact that dichotomous indicators or phenomena are limited to two
possible answers (yes and no, or 1 and 0) violates two important assumptions inherent to
the ordinary least square model which are normality of error distribution and
homoscedasticity. Because there are only two possible values for the dependent variable,
the error terms are skewed toward the zero and 1 values and thus not normally distributed
around the predicted independent variables. In dichotomous variables analysis, the error
terms tend to be minimal around the middle area of probability, but greater close to the
floor or the ceiling which means that the error terms are correlated to the independent
variables (heteroscedasticity). The violation of those two assumptions results in biased
estimation of the confidence intervals which invalidate the test of significance. In
conclusion, using ordinary least square is not suitable for hypothesis testing for binary
phenomena (Pampel 2000).
To avoid the biases resulting from using the multiple regression analysis, I used
the logistic regression (logit) analyses to test the hypotheses related to the research
questions regarding the determinants of willingness to engage in climate change
mitigation actions and support of climate change mitigation policies. The logistic
transformation of probability linearizes the inherently non-linear relationship between the
probability and the independent variables through stretching the probabilities of Y (the
dependent variable) at extreme values relative to the values near the midpoint.
Accordingly, the same change of X results in similar effect on the logit regardless of the
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distance from the ceiling or floor probabilities. The logit regression result in unbiased
estimates of the coefficients, test of significance and explanatory power (Pampel 2000;
Peng and Harry 2002).
Pampel (2000) illustrated that the logistic regression linearizes the inherently
nonlinear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables in the
case of dichotomous dependent variables in two steps. First, it transforms probabilities
into odds which allow for having continuous values ranging from zero to infinity.
Second, it transforms the odds into logits by taking the natural logarithm of the odds
which allow for having negative values ranging from (–) infinity to zero. If the
probability function is
Pi = e E0+E1X1

(4.1)

Then the odd function is
Oi = Pi /(1-Pi) = e E0+E1X1/ 1- e E0+E1X1

(4.2)

The logit function is then
Ln Oi = logit = Ln [Pi / (1-Pi)] = E0 + E1 X1

(4.3)

For every coefficient, the logistic regression programs in SPSS and SAS provide
the regular (p) value or significance interval, and the Wald coefficient which equal the
square of the ratio of the coefficient divided by its standard deviation and have a chisquare distribution. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) can be used specially for
those coefficients with significant (p) to test the strength of significance. To reject the
null hypothesis (coefficient is zero), BIC which is (z2 – Ln) or (Wald –Ln n) should
exceed zero. If BIC equal zero, then the null hypothesis is not rejected. If BIC ranges
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from 0-2, then there is a week support for significance. If BIC ranges from 2-6, the
support is positive for significance, but if BIC 6-10, then the support is strong. If BIC is
more than 10, then the support is very strong (Pampel 2000; Peng and Harry 2002).
Logistic regression offers a pseudo-variance analogous to the analysis of variance
characterizing the ordinary least square model. The pseudo variance in the logit
regression plays the same role of the R2 in the case of the ordinary least square regression
as it indicates the explanatory power of the logit model to the dependent variable. The
SPSS output offers two measures of the pseudo-variance: the Cox and Snell measure and
the adjusted Nagelkerke measure (Pampel 2000; Peng and Harry 2002).
In the literature on environmental behavior, the logistic regression table was
provided including coefficients, exponentiated coefficients (Exp. B), Wald values, and
intervals if significance. The exponentiated coefficient (Exp. B) helps identify the
direction of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent
variables of concern. If Exp (B) is more than 1, then the impact is positive. If the Exp (B)
is less than one then the impact is negative.

4.5 Data Collection
In this research, I used secondary and primary data to calculate the different
indices necessary for examining my hypotheses. I collected secondary data to assess
water resources vulnerability around Nevada. I also collected primary data for assessing
both the Se and Ad.C. of individual Nevada ranchers and farmers, in addition to ranchers’
and farmers’ risk perception and environmental behavior related preferences.
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4.5.1 Primary Data
As part of the NV NSF Climate Project, I and my colleagues working for the
Policy, Decision Making and Outreach Component PDOC surveyed Nevada farming and
ranching community in two phases: The first phase was in December 2009 and the
second phase in August 2010. Through the survey, we collected data on Nevada
ranchers’ and farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics, climate change related views,
beliefs, risk perceptions and willingness to adopt or support climate change mitigation
actions and policies (see Appendix 1).
In the two phases, we sent surveys to 1872 farmers and ranchers, representing the
majority of Nevada ranching and farming community (USDA 2010). The list was
collected from a partner university program. We sent mail-out, mail-back survey packets
to all famers on the list. In the first phase, each packet included an 8 page survey, a cover
letter personally signed by Dr. William James Smith Jr. (my supervisor and the head of
the PDOC), a holiday card and a prepaid return envelope (Schutt 2006). In the second
wave, the packets included only personally signed cover letters, the surveys, and the
prepaid return envelops. In total, 479 surveys from ranchers and farmers from all over
Nevada (Figure 4-1) were filled and sent back to make a response rate of 25.6%.
However, it is worth mentioning that not all surveys were completely filled as can be
seen later in the results chapter. As can be seen in the Figure 4-1 the biggest
concentration of Nevada ranchers and farmers are in the northern part of the state, mostly
in Elko and Churchill counties while the smallest concentration is in Southern Nevada.
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Figure 4-1. Respondents’ distribution in Nevada.
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4.5.2 Secondary Data
I also collected secondary data on Nevada water resources availability, water use
and population distribution. Two GIS based databases were necessary: Water availability
and use; and population. For water availability and use, I utilized the latest version of
Water-Global Assessment and Prognosis (WaterGAP 3.1) developed by the Center for
Environmental Systems Research, Kassel University, Germany in cooperation with the
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (Perveen 2008). The population
database (LandScan 2008) was collected from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Tennessee. I signed a license agreement with both the Center for Environmental Systems
Research and Prognosis, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory so I could use the two
datasets for the purposes of this research.
This WaterGAP 3.1 dataset lists the mean surface water availability and use
monthly values and annual sums during the period 1971-2000. The dataset is available in
gridded vector format with a spatial resolution of 5’ x5’ or about 9 km x 9 km (Figure
4.2). The dataset does not cover the groundwater availability in Nevada, but surface water
is the major water supply for agricultural use in Nevada as 63% and 82% of the water
demand for irrigation and livestock respectively is met using surface water (Nevada
Division of Water Planning 1999). According to Doll, Kaspar and Lehner (2003) and
Perveen and James (2009) Water GAP databases use the best data available coupled with
two models that include the two major components of water vulnerability: A global
hydrology model; and a global water use model. The hydrology model estimates surface
runoff, groundwater recharge and rivers’ discharge, while the water use model computes
water use for households industry, irrigation, and livestock sectors.
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Figure 4-2. Gridded natural surface water availability in Nevada.
Source: WaterGAP 3.1.
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Water resources can be studied and evaluated using at least two different
categories of data structures: Political boundaries based structures; and watershed based
structures. The scale of analysis relies on its objectives, For example, water resource
managers at the municipality level will be interested in studying water resources
availability and uses within the boundaries of their municipality, whereas scientists may
be interested in studying certain water resource management issues at the national or
regional scales. Water resource experts are increasingly agreeing that best analyses of
water resources are those performed at the watershed-level, because the watershed is the
venue where all hydrologic processes such as water generation, transportation,
precipitation, recharge, and evaporation take place and shape the water availability of that
watershed regardless of any political consideration. However, because people are subgrouped into different political entities, socioeconomic data are always available in
accordance within political borders, which does not necessarily correlate with the natural
ones (Alcamo et al. 2003a; Perveen and James 2009; Doll and Hauschild 2002).
Gridded models were created as a solution for the disparity between the politically
based data structures and the watershed ones. Gridded models data structured politically
(socioeconomic) can be integrated, compared with, or merged with data that are
structured by river basin or watershed (Doll and Hauschild 2002; Perveen and James
2009). According to Alcamo et al. (2003b), the need for scale flexible water resource
modeling techniques, able to answering question regarding both water availability and
use worldwide resulted in the creation of WaterGAP models. So far three different
generations have been produced WaterGAP 1, 2 and 3. The WaterGAP models group is
one of many other global water analysis models; groups, but it is unique in the fact that it
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provides modeling capacities for both water supply and demand (Alcamo et al. 2003b).
The WaterGAP models also offer the opportunity to compare current and future
freshwater availability and use in different parts of the world at different scales.
Perveen and James (2009) investigated the impact of scale on the variance and
standard deviation of variables. They found that the variability (difference in statistical
means between cells) of un-scaled variables such as population and water supply
increases with increasing the scale (the grid size). Whereas, the variability of scaled
variables, such as water availability per capita, and population density, decreases with
increasing the scale.
The LandScan 2008 database is available in raster format with spatial resolution
of 30"x30" or about 1 km x 1km (Figure 4-3). The LandScan utilizes the best available
census data and four primary population indicators including land cover, roads, slopes
and night time lights to map population distribution at finer scales than block-level
census data (Perveen 2008; Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2011).
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Figure 4-3. Population distribution in Nevada in raster format.
Source: LandScan 2008.
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As can be seen from the discussion on data collection above, I collected
secondary data with two different spatial resolutions, 9 km x 9 km (Water GAP 3.1) 1 km
x 1km (LandScan 2008). I also collected data on the respondent ranchers’ and farmers’
addresses in zip codes. Because of the inconsistency of the three datasets I collected in
terms of spatial resolution, I used the ARCGIS 9.3 procedures (mostly spatial join
functions) to aggregate the three databases to the zip code scale.

4.6 Measures: Dependent Variables
I used three survey questions to measure the dependent variables of my research:
1) Risk perception; 2) willingness to engage in climate change mitigation individual
actions; and 3) willingness to support climate change mitigation policies. The questions
took the numbers 35, 38, and 39 respectively. The wording of the three questions is
shown below.

Risk Perception
35. Please use the scale below to indicate how much you think climate change will
negatively impact the following.
A) _____You personally
B) _____Your family
C) _____Your surrounding ranching/farming community
D) _____People in the United States
E) _____People in other modern industrialized countries
F) _____People in least-wealthy countries
G) _____Future generations of people
H) _____Plant and animal species
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Individual Behavior
38. What of the following are you willing and able to do about climate change to reduce
its impacts? Please check as many as you would adopt.
□ Increase the amount of insulation in your home to decrease your energy
consumption.
□ Install low-energy light bulbs in your house.
□ Plant more trees near your home.
□ Use public transportation more than you do now.
□ Use more fuel-efficient vehicles.
□ Nothing
Others________________________________________________________

Public Policies
39. At the national level, which of the following policies and initiatives would you
support to help reduce climate change? Check as many as you would support.
□ Develop renewable energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal.
□ Educate the public, including through schools, on human causes of climate
change.
□ Impose taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for
climate change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into
increased prices of some goods.
□ Impose taxes on fossil fuels (gasoline) for climate change mitigation,
understanding that this might translate into higher gasoline prices.
□ Impose taxes on citizens for climate change mitigation.
□ Pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles.
□ Pressuring the U.S. government to ratify international protocols which
commit the U.S. to fast reduction of carbon emissions.
□ Use market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial
emissions.
□ Nothing
Others________________________________________________________

68

4.7 Measures: Independent Variables
4.7.1 Vulnerability Indices
Within this research, I calculated indices for climate change P.V., Se, and Ad.C.
of Nevada ranchers and farmers, and then I aggregated those indices in one vulnerability
index. In the following subsections, I provide a detailed description of the calculation I
conducted.
Physical vulnerability (P.V.): I used water resource vulnerability as an indicator
of the P.V. to climate change of Nevada ranchers and farmers. I used ARCGIS 9.1
software to map and calculate both the Falkenmark Index (population/ natural surface
water availability) and Criticality Ratio (water use/ natural surface water availability
water availability) by zip code (Falkenmark and Widstrand 1992; Kulshreshtha 1999;
Perveen and James 2009). As discussed above, I used both the WaterGAP.3.1 database
for data on natural water availability and water use, and the LandScan 2008 population
datasets. I normalized the two indices using the following equation.
Indexsd =Sd-Smin/Smax-Smin

(4.4)

Then, I used both the normalized Falkenmark index and Criticality Ratio to
estimate the Water Vulnerability Index (WRV) which is used as the P.V. index in this
research. The WRV was calculated using the following equation. It ranges from 0-1 (See
Figure 5.4 in the results section).
WRV= (normalized Falkenmark Index+ normalized Criticality Ratio)/2 (4.5)
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Sensitivity index (Se): I used the External Income Diversity Index as a proxy for
ranchers’ and farmers’ Se to climate change. For every rancher and farmer, I calculated
the proportion of her/his income originating from agricultural activities to the total
household income (Hahn, Riederer and Foster 2009). Then I normalized the index using
equation (4.4).
Adaptive capacity (Ad.C.): For Ad.C. I calculated two indices: The Social Status
Index and the Poverty Index. I calculated the Social Status Index based on Halingshed
(1975). It ranges from 26 to 66. This index is derived from 4 factors which are occupation
(career), education, income and marital status (Hollingshed 1975; Cirino et al. 2002). For
single, divorced and widowed ranchers and farmers, I used only their education to
calculate their education scores, but for married ones I averaged the scores of both the
rancher and farmer and her/his spouse. The scores of education are listed in table 4-1. For
career or occupation scores I used the total income of each rancher and farmers to assign
her/him a score as in the following table.
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Table 4-1. Education and Occupation Scores for Calculating the Social Status Index.
Education Scores
Educational Degree

Score

Middle School

6

High School

12

Some college or 2-year college degree

15

4-year college degree

18

Graduate and professional

21
Occupation Scores

Income

Score

$0-25,000

20

$25,000—50,000

25

$50,000-100,000

32.5

$100,000-300,000

40

>300,000

45

Source: Created from Hollingshed (1975).

The Poverty Index was calculated by deducting the poverty line from the
household income for every rancher and farmer surveyed (income – poverty line) as
developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbeckei (1984). The Poverty line is derived from the
U.S. department of Health and Human Services (HHS 2009) based on the household size
(Table 4-2). Then I normalized both indices using equation (4.4). Finally, I averaged the
two indices by summing the two normalized indices and dividing them by two to
formulate the Ad.C. index.
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Table 4-2. The 2010 Poverty Guidelines for the 48 Continuous States and the District of
Columbia.
Family Size

Poverty Line

1

$10,830

2

$14,570

3

$18,310

4

$22,050

5

$25,790

6

$29,530

7

$33,270

8

$37,010

Source: Adopted from HHS (2009).

Vulnerability: As a composite vulnerability index I used the approach of Hahn,
Riederer and Foster (2009) in calculating the Livelihood vulnerability Index ranges from
-1 (least vulnerable) to 1 (most vulnerable). I used the following equation improved from
Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009):
Vulnerability= L.V.I = (P.V.-Ad.C.+Se)/3.

(4.6)

4.7.2 Models Parameters
As can be seen above the regression models include variables proven significant
or often investigated as determinants of risk perception and environmental behavior.
These variables were measured through survey questions as following:


Age: The ranchers and farmers were asked to state their age in question 1



Gender: Question two asked the ranchers and farmers to check their gender.
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Ideological affiliation: As can be seen in Appendix 1, question 21, ranchers
and farmers were asked to indicate their political orientation on range from
1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative). For the regression models we
modified the scale to 1 (conservative) and 0 (non-conservatives) (O’Connor,
Bord and Fisher, 1999; Leiserowtiz, 2006, 2005, 2003; Dietz, Dan and
Shown 2007).



Beliefs regarding the causes of climate change: Those beliefs were
measured through asking the participants to rank their agreement on the
statement “I believe that human activity has been playing a significant role
in recent climate change” using a scale that ranges from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). This question was listed as branch (D), in
question 30 of the survey (Appendix 1).



Beliefs regarding the connection between the temporary drought in Nevada
and climate change. In question 40, of the survey (Appendix 1), ranchers
and farmers were asked to check what they perceived as causes of the
contemporary drought in Nevada. I used only the branch on climate change
as a cause. My variable ranged from (1) if checked to (0) if not checked.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ General Characteristics
The survey data indicates that only 26.3% of Nevada ranchers and farmers are
females (N=476). Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ average age is 61.8± 13.3 years old
(Median 62, N =472); whereas, the minimum age is 21 and the maximum is 95 years old.
The vast majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N = 473) are married (83.7%), while
7.8% of them are widowed, 4.4% are divorced and 4.1% are single. The average size of
Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ households is 2.6 ± 1.4 members (N=449). The smallest
household’s size is 1 and the largest is 9.
Ranchers and farmers are a well-educated group; only 18.1% (N=474) of them
hold high school education or less (Figure 5-1). About 32.7% of Nevada ranchers and
farmers hold some or two years college education, 32.9% of them hold 4-year college
degrees, and the rest (16.3%) hold graduate and professional degrees.

Figure 5-1. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ education level.
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The majority of Nevada Agricultural community perform both ranching and
farming (Figure 5-2). The biggest proportion of our participants (38.7%, N =457)
practice both ranching and farming, 28.4% practice ranching, 26.5% practice farming,
and 6.3% practice other agricultural activities such as beekeeping, aquaculture and
organic educational agriculture.

Figure 5-2. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ agricultural activities.

Most of Nevada ranchers and farmers (64.0%, N=425) rely on other sources of
income in addition to their agricultural activities. While, about 62.1% of the participant
ranchers and farmers (N= 425) make less than $25,000 a year from agricultural activities,
only 15.2% of them make less than $25,000 as a net household income (Figure 5-3).
Most of Nevada ranchers and farmers make less than $150,000 a year; as much as 94.4%
and 85.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers make less than $150,000 a year as
agricultural income and a net household income respectively. Only 2.3% of the surveyed
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ranchers and farmers make more than $500,000 as a net household income, while 0.9%
make more than $500,000 from agriculture only.

Figure 5-3. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ agricultural and net household incomes.

5.2 Worldviews and Political Orientations
Nevada ranchers and farmers are a highly politicized and conservative group.
About 97.8% of the participants are registered to vote (N=461). About 73.3% of Nevada
ranchers and farmers (N=434) are Republicans, 13.8% are democrats, 11.3% are either
independents or supporting other parties (Tea Party and the Green Party) Only, a very
small minority of them (1.6%) are not interested in politics. This political affiliation is a
translation of a ubiquitous conservative orientations as the vast majority (76.4%) of
Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=454) consider themselves conservatives or very
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conservative (Figure 5-4). Only 7.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers consider
themselves liberal or very liberal and 16.1% consider themselves middle of the road.

Figure 5-4. The political orientations of Nevada ranchers and farmers.

The more conservative stance of most Nevada ranchers and farmers expresses
itself in their opinions and worldviews. The vastest majority of Nevada ranchers and
farmers are libertarians as they do not support a big governmental role in the economy.
About 69.0% of them (N=462) believe that the government should have a minimal role in
the economy, 27.3% believe the government should have a moderate role, and only 3.7%
of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that the government should have large role in the
economy. Moreover, 74.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=461) agree or strongly
agree with the statement that “property rights guarantee the right to do whatever you want
on your own land”, compared to 6.3% who are neutral, and 19.1% who disagree or
strongly disagree with this statement.
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5.3 Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ Vulnerability to Climate Change
Mapping water stress in Nevada using data on surface water availability and use
in Nevada over the period 1971 to 2000, and 2008 population by zip code reveals that the
most water stressed areas are those in Washoe, Carson City and Clark counties. Washoe,
Carson City and Clark counties include the largest urban centers in Nevada which are
Reno, Carson City and Las Vegas metropolitan areas respectively (Figure 5-5). The range
of Water Vulnerability Index spans from 0.0 at zip codes 89883, Elko County, to 0.56 in
zip code 89134, Clark County. The Ad.C. index ranges from 0.01 for a married person,
with middle school education (same for the spouse) and annual income of less than
$25,000, to 0.96 for another married person with a 4-year college education (same for the
spouse) and a household income that is more than one million U.S. dollars. Se index
ranges from 0.00 for a participant whose agricultural income is only about 3 % of her/his
household income, to 1 for a participant who relies entirely on farming for his household
income.
The composite index of vulnerability ranges from -0.29 to 0 0.46. the -0.29
vulnerability value is assigned for a participant who lives in a relatively water rich area,
holds a 4-year college degree, married to a 4-year college graduate spouse, and earns a
household income that exceeds the million dollars limit, with only 9% of this income
originates from ranching/farming. Whereas, the vulnerability index value of 0.46 is
assigned to a participant who is married, lives in a water stressed area, holds a high
school degree (the spouse has some college education), and earns a household income of
less than $25,000 originates entirely from agriculture.
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Figure 5-5. Water resource vulnerability in Nevada.

5.4 Views, Beliefs and Opinions on Climate Change
The vast majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (94.2%, N=479) are aware of
climate change, mostly through TV (60.3%), radio (29.0%), and the internet (21.9%).
However, as can be seen in figure 5-6, only 61.3% of them believe that we are in a period
of climate change (N=468), 93.0% believe that climate change happens naturally over
time (N=470), and as few as 28.9% (N=465) believe that human activity is a significant
cause of climate change. A very slim minority (6.0%, N=465) believe that human activity
is the only cause of climate change.

79

Figure 5-6. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ beliefs regarding climate change and its causes.

The denial of climate change and its anthropogenic causes extends to include the
ranchers’ and farmers’ views regarding the scientific agreement on climate change.
Around 30.0% (N= 473) of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that scientists disagree
among themselves regarding the reality of climate change (Figure 5-7). About 12.7% of
the ranchers and farmers believe that scientists agree that climate change is happening,
26.2% believe that the scientists agree that climate change is happening, but mostly
natural, and 16.9% believe that the scientists agree that climate change is happening but
mostly anthropogenic. On the other hand, 3.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe
that the scientists agree that climate change is not happening, and 10.6% of Nevada
ranchers and farmers do not know enough about the scientist’s position regarding climate
change.
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Figure 5-7. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ views regarding the scientists’ agreement on climate
change and its causes.

The biggest percentage of Nevada ranchers and farmers (36.9%, N=442) are not
sure regarding the time at which climate change will start harming their communities
(Figure 5-8). About 31.9% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that climate change is
affecting their communities now or will start impacting such communities within the next
10 years. On the other hand, 23.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that their
communities will never be impacted by climate change, or will be impacted only in the
coming 50-100 years (3.8%), or 25 years (3.8%).
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Figure 5-8. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ expectations regarding the immanency of climate change
impacts.

Nevada ranchers and farmers show optimistic bias in their climate change risk
judgments as they tend to rate climate change risk on themselves (Self) and family (Fa)
lower than other risk targets such as their ranching and farming communities (Ag), least
wealthy nations (L.W.N.), future generations (Gn.) and ecosystems (Eco.). As can be
seen in Table 5-1, only 12.4% (N=443) and 14.3% (N=440) of Nevada ranchers and
farmers rate the expected impact of climate change on themselves or their families
respectively to be a great deal, but 28.8% (N=438) rate climate change impacts on the
least wealthy countries to be a great deal, compared to 28.0% (N=436), and 24.4%
(N=439) for future generations and plants and animals respectively. Almost 59.1% and
54.8% of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that climate change will not impact or
impact themselves and their families only a little respectively. These percentages go
down to 44.3%, 42.2%, and 46.5% when using least wealthy countries, future generations
and plants and animals as risk targets. When using the U.S. and the industrialized
countries (W.N.) as risk targets, 20.6% (N=438), and 17.8% (N=437) of Nevada ranchers
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and farmers rate climate change risk as a great deal respectively, compared to 44.6% and
46% who rate climate change risk as nonexistent or only a little.

Table 5-1. Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ Climate Change Risk Perceptions.
Self

Fa

Ag

U.S.

W.N.

L.W.C

Gn.

Eco.

Not at All

30.9%

27.5%

23.5%

20.8%

21.3%

25.3%

23.2%

23.7%

Only a
Little

28.2%

26.6%

23.3%

23.7%

24.7%

18.9%

19.0%

22.8%

A
Moderate
Amount

24.8%

27.3%

25.5%

27.4%

25.2%

17.1%

17.9%

19.8%

A Great
Deal

12.4%

14.3%

24.2%

20.6%

17.8%

28.8%

28.0%

24.4%

Don’t
Know

3.6%

4.3%

3.6%

7.5%

11.0%

9.8%

11.9%

9.3%

N

438

436

437

432

432

432

431

434

Risk
Perception

Regarding the drought which is affecting Nevada since the last few years of the 20st
century, Nevada ranchers and farmers tend not to connect it to climate change (Figure 59). Only, 26% of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=479) think of climate change as a
possible cause of the current drought but 9% blame the production of greenhouse gases as
a separate cause of the drought. Whereas, 80% think that the current drought is the part
of a natural climate cycle that impact Nevada. About 6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers
blame pollution for the current drought, but 65% of the respondents blame the cities and
the over consumption of water.
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Figure 5-9. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary
drought in Nevada.

The optimistic bias of Nevada ranchers and farmers regarding the severity and
imminences of climate change impacts on themselves, families and communities
presumably resulted in a relaxed attitude regarding the personal importance of climate
change to them (5-10). Only 8% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that climate
change is extremely important to them, 16.6% consider climate change to be very
important to them, but 75.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers consider climate change as
unimportant or somewhat important.
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Figure 5-10. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ appreciating of climate change importance to them
personally.

The willingness of Nevada ranchers and farmers to adopt one or more climate
change mitigation individual actions of a list offered to them in the survey varies
depending on the perceived cost or difficulty of each of the choices (See Figure 5-11).
About 59.1% of the respondents (N=479) indicate that they are willing to increase the
amount of installations in their homes to decrease their energy consumptions and 60.1%
(N=479) stated that they are willing to install low-energy light bulbs in their houses.
Actually, some of the ranchers and farmers indicate that they have already increased the
amount of insulation and installed low-energy light bulbs in their houses. Many
participants (16) stated in their written comments that they are willing to apply one or
both of those acts (or already did) because it “makes sense” or saves money” regardless
of the connection to climate change.
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A smaller majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (53.0%, N=479) are willing to
plant trees, or use more fuel-efficient vehicles (51.4%, N=479). The willingness to
decrease energy consumption (or mitigate climate change) plummets to 9.2% (N=479)
when speaking about increasing the use of public transportation. This option is perceived
as inconvenient or even impossible as reported by some participants who stated that they
live tens of miles away from any built environment. However, Nevada farmers and
ranchers are not big supporters of doing nothing as only 13.4% of them indicated that
they are willing to do nothing for climate change mitigation.

Fig 5-11. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to adopt climate change mitigation actions.
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When it comes to public policies, Nevada ranchers and farmers are not big
supporters of governmental interventions. Only 3.6% (N=479) of the respondents think
that climate change should be considered a top or high priority to the U.S. government,
and 12.7% think that climate change should be a high governmental priority (Figure 512). On the other hand, 28.8% think that climate change should not be a priority at all to
the U.S. government and the majority 54.9 % think climate change should be considered
a low or medium priority.

Figure 5-12. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ appreciation of climate change as a national
priority.

When asking about specific climate change mitigation policies, a solid majority
(69.1%, N=473) of the respondents support developing renewable energy resources, but
not any of the other policy options (Figure 5-13). Only 41.2% of the respondents support
pressuring the car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, less respondents
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(33.2%) support educating the public about climate change and its human causes through
schools, and much less respondents (16.7%) support pressuring the government to ratify
international climate change protocols. The least popular of all is taxation policies.
While 28.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers support using market incentives and
pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial emissions of CO2, only 15.0% support
imposing taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for climate
change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into increased prices of some
goods. Even less popular is imposing taxes on fossil fuels (9.7%), and citizens (2.3%) for
climate change mitigation. However, only 16.9% of the respondents support doing
nothing as a governmental policy facing climate change.

Figure 5-13. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ Support of different climate change public policies.
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5.5 The Determinants of Risk Perception
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms
of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases individuals’ perception of climate change risk. They also
predicted that both P.V. and Se to climate change as separated factors increase risk
perception, while Ad.C. decreases risk perception.
To test these hypotheses a set of bivariate correlations and multiple regression
analyses were performed. The correlation analyses included testing the relationships
between the respondents’ risk appreciation on different risk targets and the composite
vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index. Additionally, the analyses
included possible correlations between risk appreciation by risk target and other
parameters including age, gender, political orientation (conservative or not), beliefs
regarding climate change (believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change), and
beliefs concerning the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (believing in
climate change as a possible cause or not).
Two sets of ordinary least square multiple regression analyses were conducted.
One set that includes risk perception by risk target as dependent variables and a model
that contains the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political orientation, beliefs
regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in
Nevada. The other set includes risk perceptions by risk target and a model that contains
indices of the separated components of vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender,
political orientation, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs concerning the causes
of the contemporary drought in Nevada.
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The correlation analyses reveal that neither composite vulnerability index nor its
components correlate with any of the ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perception on the set of
risk targets examined except for climate change risk on the least wealthy countries, where
living in more water stressed areas (P.V.) correlates positively with ranchers’ and
farmers’ risk perception (Table 5-2). Age also seems not to correlate with risk perception
on any risk target; however, gender and political orientation correlate consistently will
risk perception on all targets. Women and non-conservatives rank the risk of climate
change higher than men and conservatives on all risk targets. Believing in the
anthropogenic causes of climate change correlates strongly with risk perception on all
risk targets with Pearson Correlation Coefficients ranging from 0.465 to 0.556. Believing
that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada also
correlates strongly with risk perception on all risk targets with Pearson Correlation
Coefficients ranging from 0.436 to 0.443.
Table 5-2. Correlation Matrix of Risk Perception by Risk Target (R.T.) and
Determinants.
R.T
L.V.I
P.V.
Ad.C.
Se
A
G
P.O.
C.H.
B

Self
(.000)
N=376
(.051)
N=426
(.042)
N=391
(.017)
N=400
(-.064)
(N=437)
(-.209)**
N=440
(-.275)**
N=425
(.531)**
N= 434

Fa
(.012)
N=374
(.008)
N=424
(.023)
N=388
(.024)
N=397
(-.041)
N=434
(-.226)**
N=437
(-.308)**
N=422
(.548)**
N=434

Ag
(.006)
N=376
(.093)
N=426
(.030)
N=391
(.003)
N=400
(-.015)
N=437
(-.247)**
N=440
(-.331)**
N=425
(.531)**
N=434

U.S.
(-.037)
N=370
(.036)
N=420
(.064)
N=385
(-.027)
N=394
(-.039)
N=431
(-.225)**
N=434
(-.331)**
N=419
(.515)**
N=428

D.B.

W.N.
(.010)
N=371
(.071)
N=420
(.033)
N=386
(.030)
N=395
(.006)
N=431
(-.214)**
N=434
(-.282)**
N=419
(.465)**
N=428

(.474)** (.469)** (.459)** (.409)** (.318)**
N=443
N=440
N=443
N=437
N=437
Pearson Correlation in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level.
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L.W.N.
(-.088)
N=373
(.112)*
N=423
(.079)
N=387
(-.081)
N=395
(-.014)
N=433
(-.239)**
N=436
(-.362)**
N=420
(.556)**
N=428

Gn.
Eco
(-.048)
(.058)
N=372
N=372
(.086)
(.095)
N=421
N=422
(.049)
(.030)
N=386
N=387
(-.049)
(-.064)
N=394
N=396
(-.062)
(-.034)
N=431
N=433
(-.182)** (-.206)**
N=434
N=436
(-.306)** (-.337)**
N=418
N=421
(.533)** (.548)**
N=427
N=430

(.404)**
N=438

(.399)**
N=436

(.404)**
N=439

The regression analyses of risk perception by risk target and a model that include
vulnerability to climate change , as composite index of P.V., Se, and Ad.C., shows that
vulnerability to climate change is not a determinant of risk perception on any risk target
(Table 5-3). Age and gender are not insignificant determinants of risk perception. Except
for themselves and families, conservatives continued to perceive climate change risk
lower than others according to this model. Ranchers and farmers who believe that climate
change is anthropogenic and a possible cause of Nevada drought perceive climate change
risk higher than others on all risk targets.

Table 5-3. O.L.S Regression Results Explaining Risk Perceptions by Risk Target Using a
Model That Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index.
Risk
Target
Intercept
L.V.I.
A
G
P.O.
CC.B.
D.B.

Self

Fa

Ag

U.S.

W.N.

L.W.N.

Gn

Eco

1.865
(.330)**
.187
(0.288)
-.007
(.003)*
-.137
(.108)
-.093
(.119)
.299
(.041)**
.691
(.114)**
0.381

1.829
(.335)**
.358
(.292)
-.004
(.003)
-.190
(.109)
-.164
(.120)
.322
(.042)**
.674
(.116)**
.407

2.129
(.365)**
.258
(.318)
-.002
(.004)
-.221
(.119)
-.337
(.131)*
.323
(046)**
.617
(.127)**
.383

1.946
(.388)**
-.063
(.338)
-.001
(.004)
-.226
(.128)
-.297
(.140)*
.354
(.049)**
.445
(.135)**
.340

1.630
(.419)**
.357
(.366)
.003
(.004)
-.235
(.138)
-.332
(.151)*
.344
(.052)**
.298
(.146)*
.275

2.080
(.415)**
-.524
(.362)
.002
(.004)
-.368
(.136)**
-.460
(.149)**
.383
(.052)**
.554
(.144)
0.397

1.722
(.443)**
-.193
(.387)
-.006
(.005)
-.056
(.144)
-.345
(.159)*
.428
(.055)**
.523
(.153)**
.347

1.931
(.400)**
-.163
(.349)
-.003
(.004)
-.208
(.131)
-.341
(.144)*
.399
(050)**
.497
(.139)**
.378

363

352

358

359

359

359

Adjusted
R2
N
363
360
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.

The multiple regression analyses of risk perception by risk targets and the model
that include the separated components of vulnerability reveal a little bit more complicated
picture on the role of vulnerability components on climate change risk perception (Table
5-4). The model is a robust model explaining 0.28 to .427 of the variance in risk
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perception depending on the risk target examined. The regression analyses establish that
P.V. makes people perceive the risk of climate change on themselves, their families, and
the U.S. lower than those who are less physically vulnerable. Regarding the other risk
targets such as the wealthy countries, least wealthy countries, future generations and
plants and animals, physical vulnerability stops being a significant determinant of risk
perception. In other words, those farmers/ranchers who live in a more water stressed
areas, thus more vulnerable to possible climate change imposed drought, perceive the risk
of climate change to be less serious on themselves, their families and the U.S. than those
who live in less vulnerable areas.
Adaptive Capacity does not impact risk perception on any risk target. However,
Se to climate change positively impacts risk perception on oneself, families and wealthy
countries. In other words, ranchers and farmers who depend more on agriculture for their
living perceive the risk of climate change on themselves, families and wealthy countries
higher than those who have higher share of their income originating from other sources.
When it comes to other risk targets, the more sensitive ranchers and farmers perceive risk
the same as the less sensitive ones.
Age and gender do not seem to be significant determinants of risk perception on
any risk target except for less wealthy countries where women perceive the impact of
climate change to be greater on them than men. Except for oneself and families, the
conservative ranchers and farmers rank climate change risk lower than the liberals or
middle of the road ones. Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change and
believing that climate change may be a cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada
increase climate change risk appreciation on all risk targets.
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Table 5-4. O.L.S Regression Results Explaining Risk Perceptions Using a Model That
Includes the Three Components of Vulnerability Separated.
Risk
Target
Intercept
P.V.
Ad.C.
Se
A
G
P.O.
C.H.B
D.B.

Self

Fa

Ag

U.S.

W.N.

L.W.N.

Gn.

Eco

1.626
(.362)**
-1.078
(.435)*
.554
(.293)
.334
(.138)*
-.006
(.003)
-.158
(.107)

1.635
(.366)**
-1.331
(.439)**
-.462
(.295)
.394
(.139)**
-.002
(.003)
-.207
(.108)

1.922
(.405)**
-.581
(.487)
.419
(.328)
.278
(.115)
-.001
(.004)
-.247
(.120)

1.684
(.427)**
-1.087
(.512)*
0.644
(.354)
.268
(.163)
.001
(.004)
-.245
(.127)

1.288
(.436)**
-.543
(.557)
.617
(.375)
.405
(.177)*
.005
(.004)
-.268
(.138)

1.798
(.460)**
-.447
(.553)
.710
(.373)
.052
(.176)
.002
(.004)
-.383
(.136)**

1.583
(.493)**
-.301
(.592)
.338
(.399)
-.062
(.327)
-.006
(.005)
-.060
(.678)

1.932
(.445)**
-.519
(.535)
.101
(.361)
.005
(.170)
-.003
(0.004)
-.200
(.132)

-.142
(.119)
0.301
(.041)**
0.715
(.113)**
0.396

-.228
(.120)
0.325
(.041)**
.702
(.114)**
.427

-.354
(.134)**
.325
(.046)**
.624
(.127)**
.382

-.350
(.141)**
.357
(.048)**
.477
(.134)**
.353

-.351
(.153)**
.347
(.052)**
.315
(.145)*
.281

-.482
(.152)**
.385
(.052)**
.557
(.144)**
0.400

-.364
(.162)**
.429
(.055)**
.539
(.154)**
.347

-.375
(.147)**
.400
(050)**
.513
(.139)
.378

364

358

359

360

360

360

Adjusted
R2
N
364
361
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.

In summary, vulnerability to climate change as a function of P.V., Se, and Ad.C.
is not a determinant of risk perception. However, the components of vulnerability act
differently. P.V. results in less risk perception on oneself and family; whereas, Se results
in higher risk perception on oneself and family and less wealthy countries. However, both
P.V. and Se are not significant determinants of the risk perception on other risk targets.
Ad.C. does not result in any change of risk perception on any risk target.
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5.6 The Determinants of Willingness to Act to Mitigate Climate Change
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change as a
function of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in
individual actions aiming at mitigating climate change. They also predicted that both P.V.
and Se to climate change as separate factors increase the willingness to mitigate climate
change, while Ad.C. decreases such willingness.
I performed a set of bivariate correlations and logistic regression analyses to test
the above mentioned hypotheses. The correlation analyses included testing the
relationships between the willingness to conduct a set of collimate change mitigation
actions and the composite vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index.
The set of actions includes doing nothing, increasing the amount of insulation at home
(In), installing low-energy light bulbs (E.L), planting more trees (Tr.), increasing use of
public transportation (Trans.), and using more fuel efficient vehicles (E.Ve.).
Additionally, I tested for possible correlations between willingness to engage in climate
change mitigation individual actions and other parameters including age, gender, political
orientation (conservative or not), beliefs regarding climate change (believing in the
anthropogenic causes of climate change), and beliefs regarding the causes of the
contemporary drought in Nevada (believing in climate change as a possible cause or not).
Two sets of Logistic regression analyses were performed. One set that includes
willingness to act individually for mitigating climate change as a dependent variable and
a model that encloses the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political
orientations, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the
contemporary drought in Nevada as the independent variables. The second set of logistic
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regression analyses includes willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change as
a dependent variable and a model that encloses indices of the separated components of
vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender, political orientation, beliefs regarding
climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada.
The correlation analyses reveal that there is no significant correlation between the
composite vulnerability Index and the willingness to engage in any of the individual
actions investigated (Table 5-5). P.V. positively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’
intention to install light bulbs, but does not correlate with their willingness to do any
other activity. Se, on the other hand, negatively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’
willingness to plant trees and use fuel efficient vehicles, but does not correlate with their
willingness to do any other activity. Ad.C. does not correlate with the willingness to
engage any climate change individual action. Age negatively correlates with the
willingness to plant trees and use public transportation.
Being a woman positively correlates with the willingness to increase the amount
of insulation at home or usage of more fuel efficient vehicles, and negatively correlates
with the willingness to do nothing to mitigate climate change. Being conservative
negatively correlates with the willingness to do all of the mitigation options listed, and
positively correlates with the willingness to do nothing. Believing that climate change is
anthropogenic and believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary
drought in Nevada correlate positively with the willingness to engage in all climate
change mitigation individual actions listed, and negatively correlates with the willingness
to do nothing to mitigate climate change.
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Table 5-5. Correlation Matrix of Willingness to Act Individually Mitigating Climate
Change and Determinants.
Action

L.V.I.
P.V.
Ad.C.

In

E.L.

Tr.

Trans.

E.Ve.

Doing
Nothing

(-.050)
N= 399
(.047)
.N=458
(.026)
N=417

(-.057)
N=399
(.108)*
N=458
(.025)
N=417

(-.068)
N=399
(.033)
N=458
(.003)
N=417

(-.082)
N=399
(.005)
N=458
(.058)
N=417

(-.089)
N=399
(.086)
N=458
(.035)
N=417

(-.041)
N=399
(-.075)
N=458
(.001)
N=417

(-.108)*
N=425
(-.193)**
N=472
(-.056)
N=476
(-.143)**
N=454
(.339)**
N=465
(.163)**
N=479

(-.079)
.425
(-.120)**
N=472
(.005)
N=476
(-.115)*
N=454
(.215)**
N=465
(.133)**
N=479

(-.102)*
N=425
(.011)
N=472
(-.127)**
N=476
(-.253)**
N=454
(.427)**
N=465
(.253)**
N=479

(-.017)
N=425
(.044)
N=472
(.092)*
N=476
(.206)**
N=454
(-.338)**
N=465
(-.193)**
N=479

Se

(-.072)
(-.078)
N=425
N=425
A
(-.059)
(-.078)
N=472
N=472
G
(-.138)**
(-.087)
N=476
N=476
P.O.
(-.178)**
(-.219)**
N=454
N=454
CC.B.
(.347)**
(.474)**
N=465
N=465
D.B.
(.275)**
(.341)**
N=479
N=479
Pearson Correlation in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.

The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to engage in climate change
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the composite
index of vulnerability, shows that vulnerability does not influence ranchers’ and farmers’
willingness to do any of the individual actions aiming at mitigating climate change(Table
5-6). Age does not impact the willingness to do any individual action, except for planting
trees and using public transportation; older ranchers and farmers are less willing to plant
trees or use public transportation.
The analyses show that both gender and political orientation do not influence
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in climate change mitigation actions.
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and farmers
more willing to engage in energy conservation actions. Believing that climate change is a
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possible cause of the contemporary drought makes ranchers and farmers more willing to
increase the amount of insulations and energy-efficient light bulbs, but does not influence
Their willingness to increase their use of public transportation, use more fuel efficient
vehicles, or plant more trees.

Table 5-6. Logit Regression Results Explaining Willingness to engage in Mitigation
Actions Using a Model that Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index.
Action

In

E.L.

Tr.

Trans.

E.Ve.

L.V.I.
Std. Error
.749
.813
.729
1.263
.773
Wald
.106
.281
1.174
2.733
1.982
Significance
(.745)
(.596)
(.279)
(.098)
(.159)
Exp. (B)
.784
.650
.454
.113
.337
A
Std. Error
.009
.010
.009
.014
.009
Wald
1.583
3.668
12.628
4.206
.013
Significance
.208
(.055)
(.000)**
(.040)*
(.909)
Exp. (B)
.989
.982
.969
.971
.999
G
Std. Error
.289
.316
.269
.430
.288
Wald
2.833
1.375
.260
.231
1.430
Significance
(.092)
(.241)
(.610)
(.631)
(.232)
Exp. (B)
.615
.690
.872
1.229
.708
P.O
Std. Error
.325
.369
.302
.444
.324
Wald
.070
.069
.115
-.019
2.834
Significance
(.791)
(.792)
(.734)
(.889)
(.092)
Exp. (B)
.917
.907
.903
.940
.580
CC.B.
Std. Error
.110
.128
.107
.176
.112
Wald
19.522
41.881
24.045
6.160
35.799
Significance
(.000)**
(.000)**
(000)**
(.013)*
(.000)**
Exp. (B)
1.623
2.286
1.686
1.548
1.960
D.B.
Std. Error
.329
.393
.295
.429
.314
Wald
8.001
10.959
.037
1.434
1.059
Significance
(.005)**
(.001)**
(.847)
(.231)
(.303)
Exp. (B)
2.537
3.673
.945
(1.672)
1.381
Constant
0.667
.282
1.199
-2.184
-.366
Negalkerke R2
0.227
.377
.192
.137
.298
N
382
382
382
382
382
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
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The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to engage in climate change
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the separate
components of vulnerability, shows that none of the vulnerability components influence
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to do any of the individual actions aiming at
mitigating climate change (Table 5-7). Age does not impact the willingness to do any
individual action, except for planting trees and using public transportation; older ranchers
and farmers are less willing to plant trees or use public transportation. Both gender and
political orientation do not influence ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in
climate change mitigation actions.
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and
farmers more willing to engage in all energy conservation actions and planting trees.
Believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought makes
ranchers and farmers more willing to increase the amount of insulations and install
energy-efficient light bulbs, but does not influence their willingness to increase their use
of public transportation or fuel efficient vehicles, or plant trees.
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Table 5-7. Logit Regression Results Explaining Willingness to engage in Mitigation
Actions Using a Model that Includes the Separated Components of Vulnerability.
Action
P.V.
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)

In
(N=383)

E.L.
(N=383)

Tr.
(N=383)

Trans.
(N=383)

E.Ve.
(N=383)

1.238
.053
(.817)
.751

1.409
.168
(.682)
1.781

1.179
.001
(.970)
1.1045

2.079
1.527
(.217)
.077

1.293
.020
(.888)
1.200

Ad.C.
Std. Error
.753
.818
.743
1.226
.768
Wald
.019
.006
1.207
.001
.017
Significance
(.890)
(.937)
(.272)
(.980)
(.895)
Exp. (B)
1.110
.937
.442
.970
(.904
Se
Std. Error
.359
.388
.353
.616
.366
Wald
.018
.417
3.344
1.516
2.165
Significance
(.893)
(.519)
(067)
(.218)
(.141)
Exp. (B)
.953
.778
.525
.468
.583
A
Std. Error
.009
.010
.009
.015
.009
Wald
1.570
3.731
13.852
4.135
.042
Significance
.210
.053
(.000)**
(.042)*
(.837)
Exp. (B)
.989
.981
.968
.970
.998
G
Std. Error
.291
.321
.273
.433
.292
Wald
2.699
1.373
.096
.267
1.256.
Significance
.100
(.241)
(.757)
(.605)
(.262)
Exp. (B)
.620
.687
.919
1.250
.721
P.O.
Std. Error
.329
.372
.308
.450
.328
Wald
.101
.041
.101
-.071
2.661
Significance
.750
(.839)
(.751)
(.789)
(.103)
Exp. (B)
.901
.927
.907
.887
.586
C.H.B
Std. Error
.110
.128
.107
.177
.113
Wald
19.530
41.962
24.281
6.437
35.944
Significance
.000**
(.000)**
(000)**
(.011)*
(.000)**
Exp. (B)
1.624
2.292
1.694
1.567
1.965
D.B
Std. Error
.330
1.029
.296
.430
.315
Wald
8.203
10.779
.063
1.538
.998
Significance
.004**
(.001)**
(.801)
(.215)
(.318)
Exp. (B)
2.577
3.640
.928
(1.705)
1.369
Constant
0.664
.282
1.722
-1.658
-.167
Negalkerke R2
0.229
.380
.200
.143
.301
383
382
383
383
383
N
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
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Choosing not to do anything to mitigate climate change individually is mostly
determined by beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change and to a
lesser extent regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (Table 5-8).
Believing that human activity imposes significant impact on climate change and
believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada,
make people less willing to do nothing, at the individual level to mitigate climate change.
Neither vulnerability to climate change nor its components impose any significant impact
on ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to do nothing. The other determinants also fail to
significantly impact such choices including being conservative. Being conservative seems
to be a significant determinant only at 10% confidence level.
In summary, vulnerability to climate change and its three components do not
predict ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change.
Age, gender and political orientation are at best week determinants of the willingness to
engage in climate change mitigation individual activities. The most prominent and
consistent factor is belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change, which makes
people more willing to act. Connecting the contemporary drought in Nevada to climate
change plays a less important role in determining peoples’ intention to do something
about climate change at the individual level.
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Table 5-8. Logit Regression Results Explaining the Willingness to Do Nothing to
Mitigate Climate Change Using Two Models: One Includes the Composite Vulnerability
Index and Another Includes Its Separate Components.
Paramete
r

LVI

P.V.

Se

Ad.C.

A

Coefficients

Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)

Logistic Regression Results
for Model 1
( The Composite
Vulnerability Index)
1.108
2.019
(.155)
.207

.014
1.803
(.179)
1.020

G

Logistic Regression Results
for
Model 2
( The Separate Components)

2.120
.004
.950
1.141
.577
3.144
(.076)
.359
1.251
.403
(.525)
.452
.015
1.889
.169
1.020

Std. Error
.0459
.464
Wald
.404
.353
Significance
(.525)
(.552)
Exp. (B)
.747
.759
P.O.
Std. Error
1.084
1.099
Wald
3.168
3.312
Significance
(.075)
(.069)
Exp. (B)
6.885
7.396
CC.B.
Std. Error
.305
.309
Wald
25.845
25.866
Significance
(.000)**
(.000)**
Exp. (B)
(.208)
D.B.
Std. Error
1.058
1.067
Wald
3.724
3.989
Significance
(.054)
(.049)*
Exp. (B)
.130
.119
Constant
-1.317
.792
Negalkerke
.384
.390
R2
N
383
383
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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5.6 The Determinants of Support for Climate Change Mitigation Policies
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms
of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support climate
change mitigation policies at the national level. They also predicted that both P.V. and Se
to climate change as separated factors enhance support of climate change mitigation
policies at the national level, while Ad.C. decreases such support.
To test these hypotheses a set of bivariate correlations and regression analyses
were performed. The correlation analyses included testing the relationships between the
willingness to support climate change mitigation policies at the national level and the
composite vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index. The set of policies
includes doing nothing, developing renewable energy resources (R.En.), educating the
public on the human causes of climate change (Ed), imposing taxes on industries and
corporates that produce greenhouse gases (T.Ind.), imposing taxes on fossil fuels (T.Fu.),
imposing taxes on citizens to mitigate climate change (T.Ci.), pressuring car companies
to produce more fuel efficient vehicles (Fu.E.), pressuring the U.S. government to ratify
international protocols (Pr.), and using market incentives to reduce industrial greenhouse
gases emissions (Mar.). Additionally, I tested for possible correlations between
willingness to support climate change mitigation policies at the national level and other
parameters including age, gender, political orientation (conservative or not), beliefs
regarding climate change (believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change), and
beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (Believing in climate
change as a possible cause or not).
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Two sets of logistic regression analyses were conducted. One set that includes the
support of climate change mitigation policies at the national level as dependent variable
and a model that included the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political
orientations, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the
contemporary drought in Nevada as the independent variables. The second set of logistic
regression analyses include the support of climate change mitigation policies at the
national level as dependent variable and a model that includes indices of the separated
components of vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender, political orientation,
beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary
drought in Nevada.
The correlation analyses reveal that there is no significant correlation between the
composite vulnerability index and support of any of the public policies investigated
except for taxing gasoline (Table 5-9). Vulnerability negatively correlates with taxing
gasoline. P.V. positively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support all
the public policy options investigated except for taxing citizens. However, Se negatively
correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support taxing corporates, taxing
fuel and ratifying international protocols, but does not correlate with their willingness to
support any of the other policies. Ad.C. does not correlate with the willingness to support
any of the climate change mitigation policies.
The correlation analyses also show that age negatively correlates with the
willingness to support taxing citizens, positively correlates with the willingness to
support pressuring the care companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and does
not correlate with any of the other options. They also show that being a woman positively
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correlates with supporting almost all the policy options except taxing fuel and taxing
citizens. Being a conservative negatively correlates with the willingness to support all the
mitigation climate change policies investigated. Believing that climate change is
anthropogenic correlates positively with the willingness to support all the investigated
climate change mitigation policies. Additionally, believing in climate change as a
possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada also positively correlates with
supporting all the mitigation policies proposed in the survey.

Table 5-9. Correlation Matrix of Supporting Climate Change Mitigation Policies and
Determinants.
Policy
L.V.I.

T.Ind.
(-.097)
N=399
(.220)**
N=458

T.Fu.
(-.152)**
N=399
(.176)**
N=458

T.Ci.
(-.82)
N=399
(.035)
N=458

Fu.E.
(.025)
N=399
(.144)**
N=458

Pr.
(-.067)
N=399
(.092)*
N=458

Mar.
(-.063)
N=399
(.117)*
N=458

(.004)
(.064)
(.015)
N=417
N=417
N=417
Se
(-.088)
(-.124)
(-.157)**
N=425
N=425
N=425
A
(-.035)
(-.029)
(.032)
N=472
N=472
N=472
G
(-.148)** (-.153)** (-.166)**
N=476
N=476
N=476
P.O.
(-.218)** (-.292)** (-.436)**
N=454
N=454
N=454
CC.B. (.412)** (.587)** (.548)**
N=465
N=465
N=465
D.B.
(.303)** (.452)** (.485)**
N=479
N=479
N=479
Pearson Correlation in parentheses.
P denotes Policy .
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.

(.069)
N=417
(-.192)**
N=425
(-.013)
N=472
(-.079)
N=476
(-.432)**
N=454
(.484)**
N=465
(.401)**
N=479

(.046)
N=417
(-.056)
N=425
(-.094)*
N=472
(-.026)
N=476
(-.167)**
N=454
(.203)**
N=465
(.177)**
N=479

(-.036)
N=417
(.002)
N=425
(.111)**
N=472
(-.212)**
N=476
(-.326)**
N=454
(.499)**
N=465
(.316)**
N=479

(-.015)
N=417
(-.128)**
N=425
(.087)
N=472
(-.132)**
N=476
(-.387)**
N=454
(.525)**
N=465
(.463)**
N=479

(.034)
N=417
(-.084)
N=425
(-.028)
N=472
(-.218)**
N=476
(-.351)**
N=454
(.464)**
N=465
(.311)**
N=479

P.V.
Ad.C.

R.En.
(-.054)
N=399
(.154)**
N=458

Ed.
(.-094)
N=399
(.137)**
N=458

The logistic regression analyses, of the willingness to support climate change
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the composite
index of vulnerability, show that vulnerability does not influence ranchers’ and farmers’
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willingness to support most of the policy options listed in the survey except for taxing
gasoline, and taxing corporates (Table 5-10). Those who are more vulnerable to climate
change are less supportive of taxing gasoline and corporates to mitigate climate change.
Older people are less supportive of taxing citizens than younger ones, but more
supportive of pressuring the companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and
pressuring the government to ratify international protocols. Women are significantly
more supportive than men for pressuring the car companies to produce more fuelefficient vehicles and using market incentives to decrease the industrial greenhouse gases
emissions, but are the same as men regarding the other policy options investigated. Being
conservatives is a significant determinant of the ranchers and farmers support for most
policies except educating the public, developing renewable energy resources, and taxing
citizens, as conservatives are less supportive of all the other mitigation policies.
However, the analyses reveal that that believing in the anthropogenic causes of
climate change makes ranchers and farmers more willing to support all mitigation policy
options. Believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought
increases ranchers’ and farmers’ support for most of the proposed policies except for
taxing citizens, pressuring car companies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles, and
using market incentives to decrease the industrial greenhouse gases emissions where this
belief stops being a significant determinant
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Table 5-10. Logit Regression Explaining Support of Climate Change Mitigation Policies
Using a Model that Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index.
Policy

R.En.

Ed.

T.Ind.

T.Fu.

T.Ci.

Fu.E.

Pr.

Mar.

L.V.I
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)

.826
.621
(.431)
2.259

.950
3.399
(.065)
.173

1.359
4.865
(027)**
.050

1.644
8.920
(.003)**
.007

2.291
.1.819
(.177)
.046

.829
.662
(.416)
1.962

1.216
.779
(.377)
.342

.888
1.605
(.205)
.325

.010
.232
.630
.995

.011
.178
(.673)
.996

.015
1.344
(.246)
1.018

.018
.171
(.679)
1.008

.027
4.053
(.044)*
.948

.010
4.055
(.044)*
1.020

.014
5.975
(.015)*
1.036

.010
1.055
(.304)
.990

.347
3.485
(.062)
.524

.316
2.028
(.154)
.638

.408
1.944
(.163)
.566

.484
.008
(.930)
1.043

.711
.025
(.875)
1.118

.293
9.046
(.003)**
.414

.389
.025
(.874)
1.063

.291
9.235
(.002)**
.411

.414
.901
(.343)
.675

.336
.014
(.905)
.961

.409
8.129
(.004)**
.311

.530
8.645
(.003)**
.211

.751
.011
(.917)
.925

.314
5.852
(.016)*
.468

.382
7.435
(.006)**
.353

.307
4.569
(.033)*
.519

.138
32.058
(.000)**
2.186

.130
48.958
(.000)**
2.481

.199
23.859
(000)**
2.645

.339
20.505
(.000)**
4.638

.411
5.678
(.017)*
2.660

.116
37.312
(.000)**
2.034

.180
29.404
(.000)**
2.647

.122
27.946
(.000)**
1.906

.447
6.911
(.009)**
3.236
0.815

.312
12.224
(.000)**
2.976
-2.291

. 409
18.575
(.000)**
5.817
-4.865

.510
5.233
(.022)*
3.208
-7.842

.806
1.198
(.180)
2.946
-.4.340

.315
1.510
.(219)
1.473
-1.441

.374
11.126
(.001)**
3.486
-6.791

.314
.953
.329
1.359
-.082

A
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
G
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
P.O.
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
C.H.B
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
D.B.
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Constant

Negalkerke
0.326
.460
.576
.590
.293
.384
.513
.349
R2
N
382
382
382
382
382
382
382
382
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
* Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.

The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to support climate change
mitigation policies as dependent variables and the model that includes the separated
components of vulnerability show that neither P.V. nor Ad.C. is a significant factor in the
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support any of the proposed climate change
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mitigation policies (Table 5-11). However, Se to climate change negatively impacts
ranchers’ and farmers’ support for taxing gasoline and taxing citizens to mitigate climate
change, but not their support for the rest of proposed mitigation policies.
Age does not impact the willingness to support most of the proposed mitigation
policies, except that it increases the willingness to support pressuring car companies to
produce more fuel efficient vehicles and the government to ratify international protocols.
Women and men have the same support for most policies except pressuring the car
companies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles and using market incentives to
decrease the emissions of the industrial sectors as women are more supportive than men
to those two policy options. Conservatives are less supportive for most policies except
educating the public, developing renewable energy resources, and taxing citizens.
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and farmers
more willing to support all the policy options listed in the survey. Believing that climate
change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought enhances ranchers’ and farmers’
willingness to support most policies except taxing citizens, pressuring car companies to
produce more fuel efficient vehicles and using market incentives to decrease the
greenhouse gases emissions of the industrial sector.
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Table 5-11. Logit Regression Results Explaining Support of Climate Change Mitigation
Policies Using a Model that Includes the Separated Components of Vulnerability.
Policy

R.En.

Ed.

T.Ind.

T.Fu.

T.Ci.

Fu.E.

Pr.

Mar.

P.V.
Std. Error
1.610
1.435
1.707
1.819
2.745
1.380
1.627
1.332
Wald
.2.531
.000
.585
.064
.058
.631
2.952
.142
Significance
(.112)
(.996)
(.444)
(.800)
(809)
(.427)
(.086)
(.706)
Exp. (B)
12.955
0.993
3.692
1.584
.516
2.993
.061
1.653
Ad.C.
Std. Error
.825
.913
1.402
1.800
2.055
.818
1.342
.883
Wald
.337
.682
.251
.062
.000
.015
.921
.489
Significance
(.561)
(.409)
(.617)
(.803)
.(988)
(.904)
(.337)
(.484)
Exp. (B)
.619
2.126
.495
.639
1.031
.906
.276
1.854
Se
Std. Error
.399
.434
.673
.903
1.074
.391
.608
.418
Wald
2.333
1.332
5.564
6.266
.288
.380
2.263
.436
Significance
(.127)
(.248)
(018)*
.(012)*
(.591)
(.538)
(.133)
(.509)
Exp. (B)
.544
.606
.204
.104
.562
1.273
.400
1.759
A
Std. Error
.010
.011
.016
.020
.028
.010
.015
.010
Wald
.271
.183
.333
.043
3.612
3.937
5.566
1.080
Significance
.602
(.669)
(.564)
(.835)
(.057)
(.047)*
(.018)*
(.299)
Exp. (B)
.995
.995
1.009
.996
.948
1.020
1.036
.989
G
Std. Error
.353
.320
.415
.496
.693
.298
.391
.295
Wald
3.816
1.965
1.163
.301
.307.
9.082
.040
9.038
Significance
(.051)
(.161)
(.281)
(.583)
(.580)
(.003)**
(.841)
(.003)**
Exp. (B)
.502
.638
.639
1.313
.1.468
.407
1.081
.411
P.O.
Std. Error
.418
.341
.425
.529
.744
.318
.396
.312
Wald
.499
.014
6.101
7.338
.219
5.350
8.213
4.310
Significance
(.480)
(.907)
(.014)* (.007)**
(.640)
(.021)* (.004)** (.038)*
Exp. (B)
.744
.961
.350
.239
.706
.479
.321
.523
CC.B.
Std. Error
.141
.130
.200
.331
.386
.116
.183
.122
Wald
32.671
48.658
22.967
20.071
5.463
37.250
30.441
27.595
Significance (.000)** (.000)** (000)** (.000)** (.019)* (.000)** (.000)** (.000)**
Exp. (B)
2.234
2.475
2.608
4.398
2.464
2.034
2.747
1.898
D.B.
Std. Error
.448
.314
..413
.512
.786
.317
.380
.315
Wald
6.478
12.377
.17.559
4.898
2.114
1.510
11.233
1.008
Significance (.011)* (.000)** (.000)** (.027)*
(.146)
.(219)
(.001)**
.315
Exp. (B)
3.130
3.013
5.641
3.106
3.135
1.475
3.575
1.373
Constant
0.967
-2.436
-3.966
-6.590
-.4.217
-1.570
-5.820
-.278
Negalkerke
0.339
.462
.587
.594
.286
.388
.521
.353
R2
N
383
383
383
383
383
383
383
383
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
* Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
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Analyzing the support for doing nothing as a national climate change mitigation policy
shows that vulnerability to climate change is a significant determinant for supporting this
choice. Those who are more vulnerable to climate change, or those who live in more
water stressed area, more reliant on agriculture for living (more sensitive) and with less
political power and financial resources (less Ad.C.), oppose doing nothing as a national
climate change mitigation policy. The only other variable that is significant in
determining ranchers’ and farmers’ support for doing nothing as a policy option is the
belief regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change. Those who believe that
climate change is anthropogenic are less supportive of this policy option.
In summary, vulnerability to climate change decreases the support for doing
nothing as a national policy facing climate change. At the same time, the majority of the
vulnerable ranchers and farmers are less supportive of some perceived high cost policies
including taxing gasoline and taxing corporates. Sensitivity is the only vulnerability
component that shows significant influence on support of some mitigation policies. The
ranchers and farmers who are more reliant on agriculture for income are less supportive
of taxing gasoline or taxing corporates. Older ranchers and farmers are more supportive
of certain policies such as pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient
vehicles and pressuring the government to ratify international treaties, but less supportive
of policies such as taxing citizens. Being conservative decreases ranchers’ and farmers’
support for many of the more costly mitigation policies. Believing in the anthropogenic
causes of climate changes enhances ranchers’ and farmers’ support to all mitigation
policies. Connecting the drought in Nevada to climate change increase ranchers’ and
farmers’ support to most of the mitigation policies investigated.
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Table 5-12. Logit Regression Results Explaining Support of Nothing as a Climate
Change Policy Using Two Models: One Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index and
Another Includes Its Components.
Parameter

L.V.I.

P.V.

Se

Ad.C.

A

Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)
Std. Error
Wald
Significance
Exp. (B)

Logistic Regression Results
for Model 1
(Vulnerability)
1.033
3.851
(.050)*
.132

.013
1.816
(.178)
0983

G

Logistic Regression Results for
Model 2
(Vulnerability Components)

1.868
.444
(.505)
.288
.495
1.520
(.218)
.543
1.038
.585
(.444)
2.213
.013
1.844
(.174)
0.983

Std. Error
.478
.483
Wald
1.969
2.013
Significance
(.161)
(.156)
Exp. (B)
1.956
1.984
P.O.
Std. Error
1.054
1.058
Wald
3.769
3.674
Significance
(.052)
(.055)
Exp. (B)
7.736
7.595
C.H.B
.
.305
.237
Std. Error
31.922
32.017
Wald
(.000)**
(.000)**
Significance
.263
(.262)
Exp. (B)
D.B.
Std. Error
.554
.554
Wald
.742
.706
Significance
(.389)
(.401)
Exp. (B)
.620
.628
Constant
-1.317
-.885
Negalkerke R2
.384
.382
N
383
383
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then
the impact is negative.
* Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
6.1 Risk Perception
As can be seen in the results chapter, Vulnerability to climate change as a
function of P.V., Se and Ad.C. does not impact climate change risk perception on any
risk target ranging from self and family to future generations and plants and trees (Table
6-1). The regression analyses show that in all cases except for the risk perception on
oneself, family and the U.S., the failure of vulnerability to impose impact on risk
perception is the result of the failure of any of its three components (P.V., Se and Ad.C.)
to be a determinant of risk perception.
Investigating the determinants of risk perception on oneself, family and the U.S
expose a more complex picture. In those cases, vulnerability to climate change is not a
significant determinant of risk perception because its components significantly act in
contradicting direction. In the case of risk perception on oneself and family, P.V. or
living in a more water stressed areas decreases risk perception, while Se or ascending
reliance on agriculture for livelihood increases risk perception. Ad.C., or increased status
and income, has no impact on risk perception in those two cases. Accordingly, the effects
of Se and P.V. on risk perception regarding climate change impacts on oneself and family
cancel out each other and make the composite vulnerability index become insignificant.
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Table 6-1: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Risk Perception.
Determinant
Vulnerability (L.V.I.)
Physical Vulnerability
(P.V.)
Sensitivity (Se)
Adaptive Capacity (Ad.C.)
Age (A)
Gender (G)

Political Orientation (P.O.)
Climate Change Beliefs
(CC.B.)
Drought Beliefs (D.B.)

Influence
No impact on any risk target.
Decreases risk perception on oneself, family and the U.S., and does not
impact risk perception on any of the other risk targets.
Increases risk perception on oneself, family and the wealthy countries,
and does not impact risk perception on any of the other risk targets.
No impact on any risk target.
Decreases risk perception on oneself, but does not impact risk
perception on any other risk target.
Women perceive the risk of climate change higher on the least wealthy
countries. But they perceive the risk of climate change the same as
men on all other risk targets.
Conservatives perceive the risk of climate change lower than others on
all risk targets except oneself and family.
Increase risk perception on all risk targets.
Increase risk perception on all risk targets.

In the case of perception of risk on the U.S., P.V. decreases risk perception
(significant at 5% interval) and Ad.C. increases risk perception (significant at 10%
interval). It seems that the positive impact of Ad.C. cancels out the negative impact of
P.V. and made the vulnerability index insignificant again.
While there is no literature that explains the impact of vulnerability, Se and Ad.C.
on risk perception, Brody et al. (2008) discussed the impact of different types of P.V. on
climate change risk perception. They found that different types of physical vulnerabilities
impose different impacts on risk perception. For example, living closer to the beach, thus
being more vulnerable to sea level rise risk, increase risk perception, living in 100 –year
flood Plains, thus being more vulnerable to increased weather extremes and fresh water
floods, decreases risk perception, while living in areas with increasing forest fires does
not affect risk perception.
Consequently, drought as a climate change risk can be one of those risks that
impose negative impacts on climate change risk perception. This might be due to the fact
that drought is natural component of the climate cycle in Nevada and the U.S. Southwest.
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Smith (2000) listed drought as a “creeping hazard” because it takes place over a long
period of time and because it is hard to determine its severity. Living in a drought prone
area for decades, adapting to it and surviving it repeatedly may make ranchers and
farmers exaggerate their fitness to deal with droughts when they take place and
underestimate the possible extent of their severity.
(Beamish 2002, p.4) identifies troubles that take place progressively and
gradually as “crescive troubles”. In dealing with those troubles people tend to ignore,
avoid or undermine such troubles till the troubles reach their tipping points and manifest
themselves through acute and catastrophic events. Climate change seems to be one of
those troubles. Ranchers and farmers living in more stressed areas may have become used
to living with drought and have grown self confidence in their surviving abilities.
Consequently, they have become even less concerned about drought as climate change
impact than others who live in better off areas.
On the other hand, those ranchers and farmers who are more sensitive to climate
change impacts are more concerned on climate change impacts on themselves and
families than others. This agree with my hypotheses as those who are more reliant on
agriculture for living are more interested in keeping their jobs viable and profitable and
thus more concerned about the impact of drought than those whom most of their income
originate from other sources than agriculture. The more reliant a rancher or a famer on
agriculture is, the more concerned she/he is about water rights and the possible increase
in water cost imposed by the drought.
However, Ad.C. seems to be insignificant or at best a very weak determinant of
risk perception on any risk target. One more time, this might be due to the progressive,
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slow and accumulative nature of drought as climate change impact. Such characteristics
may make the difference in political power (social status) or resources availability and
accessibility (income and wealth) less important or decisive in ranchers’ and farmers’
response to climate change imposed drought and thus make its impact on risk perception
idle till the drought problem reaches a tipping point and so those who are more powerful
and more resourceful will be more able to survive, adapt to, and avoid the worst impacts
of that situation.
The results of both correlation tests and regression analyses show that age is an
insignificant determinant of climate change risk perception. This agrees with the Sunblad,
Biel and Galing (2007) findings. The bivariate correlation tests show that being female
correlate positively with risk perception on all risk targets, but the regression analyses
show that the impact of gender on risk perception becomes insignificant when other
determinants are considered in the models (Table 6-2). Gender appears to be a weak
determinant of risk perception. This agrees with studies conducted by Sunblad, Biel and
Galing (2007), Leiserowitz (2006) and Semenza et al. (2008) concluding that females are
more concerned about climate change.
The correlation tests show that being conservative decreases risk perception on all
risk targets. Also, the regression analyses establish that being conservative decreases risk
perception on all risk targets except oneself and family. The impact of political
orientation on risk perception is well established in the literature (O’Connor, Bord and
Fisher 1999, Leiserowitz 2006, 2005, 2003; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Dietz and Shwom
2007).
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Table 6-2: Summarized Results of the Influence of Gender on Risk Perception and
Environmental Behavior.
Dependent Variable

Correlation Analyses Results

Regression Analysis Results

Risk Perception

Being a women correlates
positively with risk perception on
all risk targets
Being a woman correlates
positively with willing to increase
the amount of house insulation,
use more fuel efficient vehicles,
and negatively with the willing to
do nothing about climate change
Being a woman correlates
positively with supporting policies
such as developing renewable
energy, educating the public about
climate change, taxing industries,
pressuring car companies to
increase fuel efficiency,
pressuring governments to ratify
the international protocols and
using market incentives to
decrease industrial emissions

Women perceive the risk higher
only on the least wealthy nations
only
No impact of gender

Willingness to Act Individually

Support of climate change
policies

Women are more supportive
than men of pressuring car
companies to produce more fuel
efficient vehicles and using
market incentives and pollution
trading mechanisms to reduce
industrial emissions as climate
change mitigation policies. But,
gender does not impact the
willingness to support any of the
other policies

The most important determinant of climate change risk perception on all risk
targets is beliefs regarding the causes of climate change. All the correlation tests and
multiple regression analyses show that those who believe in the anthropogenic causes of
climate change perceive the risk of climate change higher than those who do not.
Even though, vulnerability to climate change impacts does not affect risk
perception, yet connecting such impacts to climate change increases risk perception on all
risk targets indiscriminately. The role of believing in climate change as a possible cause
of the contemporary drought in Nevada is evident in the results of all correlation tests and
regression analyses conducted in this research to explore the determinants of risk
perception.
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6.2 Environmental Behavior
Neither vulnerability nor its components are determinants of the willingness to
mitigate climate change at the individual level (Table 6-3). Both the bivariate correlations
tests and the logistic regression analyses show that vulnerability to climate change is not
a decisive factor in determining ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in any of
the climate mitigation options investigated in this research. Also, the bivariate analyses
establish that none of the components of vulnerability to climate change correlates with
willingness to engage in any of the climate change mitigation actions investigated except
for planting trees and using more fuel efficient vehicles, as those who are more sensitive
to climate change are less willing to engage in both of these two actions. The logistic
regression analyses show no impact of any of the components of vulnerability on the
willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change.
Table 6-3: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Willingness to Act Individually to
Mitigate Climate Change.
Determinant
L.V.I.
P.V.
Se
Ad.C.
A
G
P.O.
CC.B.
D.B.

Influence
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
Decreases the willingness to plant trees and use public transportation, but does not
impact the willingness to engage in any of the other actions.
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action.
Increases the willingness to engage in all individual actions mitigating climate
change.
Increases the willingness to increase the amount of insulation and install low-energy
light bulbs in house, but does not impact the willingness to engage in any of the other
individual actions.

When it comes to supporting climate change mitigation policies, the picture
becomes a little different (Table 6-4). The correlation analysis and the logistic regression
analyses show that vulnerability to climate change decreases ranchers’ and farmers’
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support to taxing fuel and taxing corporates as policy options, but does not impact their
support for other options. However, those who are more vulnerable to climate change are
less supportive of doing nothing as a national policy option. The correlation tests reveal
that P.V. positively correlates with the increased support of all the climate change
mitigation options, Ad.C. does not correlate with supporting any of the policy options,
but Se to climate change decreases the willingness to support taxing fuel and pressuring
the government to ratify international protocols. The logistic regression analyses reveal
that only Se significantly impacts ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support taxing
fuel and taxing corporates as policy options.
Table 6-4: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Supporting Climate Change
Mitigation Policies.
Determinant
L.V.I.

P.V.
Se
Ad.C.
A

G

P.O.

CC.B.
D.B.

Influence
Decreases support to taxing industries, taxing fuel and doing nothing as climate
change policies, and does not affect all other choices. It also decreases support for
doing nothing as a climate change policy.
No impact on the willingness to support any climate change mitigation policy.
Decreases support to taxing industries and taxing fuel as climate change mitigation
policies and does not impact support to any other policy.
No impact on the willingness to support any climate change mitigation policy.
Decreases the willingness to support taxing citizens and increase the support to
pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and pressuring the
U.S. government to ratify international protocols as climate change mitigation
policies. But, age does not impact the willingness to support any of the other policies.
Women are more supportive than men of pressuring car companies to produce more
fuel efficient vehicles and using market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms
to reduce industrial emissions as climate change mitigation policies. But, gender does
not impact the willingness to support any of the other policies
Conservatives are less supportive than others of all climate change mitigation policies
except developing renewable energy resources, and educating the public on human
causes of climate change and doing nothing.
Increases the willingness to support all climate change mitigation policies.
Increases support to climate change mitigation policies except taxing citizens for
climate change mitigation and pressuring car companies to produce more fuel
efficient cars and doing nothing.

These results disagree with my hypotheses as they show that vulnerable ranchers
and farmers are indifferent regarding their willingness to do any individual actions to
mitigate climate change or support of climate change mitigation policies. Even more,
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vulnerability to climate change decreases support for some policies that are perceived as
being costly. Yet, vulnerability to climate change makes people less willing to accept
doing nothing as a governmental policy. These results show that the more vulnerable
ranchers and farmers are, the more they want to avoid climate change (not supporting
doing nothing), However, the results show that the more the farmers and ranchers are
vulnerable, the more they are unwilling to do something themselves to mitigate climate
change, so they are either indifferent or opponent of mitigation individual actions and
national policies that require financial or other sacrifices in the form of taxes or increased
prices of goods.
There is no literature investigating the impact of vulnerability, Se and Ad.C. on
environmental behavior. Zahran et al. (2006) investigated the impacts of different
physical vulnerabilities on supporting climate change mitigation policies. Zahran et al
(2006) found that different types of physical vulnerabilities impact policy support in
different ways. While people who live in areas with increasing temperature support are
more willing to support climate change mitigation policies than those who haven’t
observed such a trend, people who live in areas closer to the beach are less supportive for
climate change mitigation policies. People who live in areas with higher natural hazards
imposing casualties support adopting climate change mitigation policies the same way as
others. My results indicate that living in a more water availability stressed area either a
weak or negative determinant of the willingness to support climate change mitigation
policies similar to living in an area with higher hazardous risk casualties or increasing
temperature.
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Again the natures of climate change as a “crescive trouble” and drought as being a
“creeping hazard” and a natural part of the climate cycle of Nevada apparently make
ranchers and farmers perceive the short term costs of acting to mitigate climate higher
than the long term benefits of avoiding climate change and its impacts ((Beamish 2002;
Smith 2000). That explains why the more vulnerable ranchers and farmers support taking
action to mitigate climate change, but do not support actions that might impose cost at the
personal level such as taxing gasoline and corporations.
Age does not impact the willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change
except in the cases of planting trees and use public transportation as those who are
younger tend to be more willing to engage in such action than the older ones. On the
other hand, older ranchers and farmers are more supportive of pressuring care companies
to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and ratifying international protocols as mitigation
policies, but less supportive to using market incentives to decrease the industrial
greenhouse gases emissions, and idle regarding the support of the other policy options.
The confusing role of gender impact on environmental behavior agrees with the
confusion in literature as can be seen in Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007), O’Connor et al.
(2002), O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999), Semenza et al. (2006).
The results of the correlation tests show that being a woman only correlates with
individual actions such as increasing the amount of insulation at home, and using more
fuel efficient vehicles, but being a woman positively correlate with supporting all the
national mitigation policy options except for doing nothing where men support this
option more than woman, and taxing fuel and citizens were there is no correlation
between gender and support of those policies (Table 6-2). The logistic regression
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analyses show that gender is not a determinant of the willingness to engage in any of the
individual actions options specified in the research.
The regression analyses also reveal that women and men have the same support
for the different climate change mitigation options investigated except for pressuring the
car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, and using market incentives to
decrease the industrial greenhouse gases emissions, where women are more supportive of
these options than men. Such a weak and variant (from option to option) role of gender
agree with the finding of O’Connor et al. (2002) and O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999).
The correlation tests show that conservatives are less willing to engage in all the
individual actions listed, and less supportive of all the national climate mitigation options
investigated. Conservatives are more supportive of doing nothing as a mitigation
individual action and a national policy options. But, the role of political orientation in
explaining the willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change disappears in the
logistic regression analyses results. But being conservative sustains its negative impact on
the willingness to support most of the national policy options except for developing more
renewable energy resources, educating the public regarding the causes of climate change,
and taxing citizens. The impact of political orientation may became muted in some of my
results because it (political orientation) sometimes act indirectly through impacting the
beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change as can be seen in Table (65). The role of political orientation is strongly evident in the literature on environmental
behavior related to climate change (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999, Leiserowitz 2006,
2005, 2003; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Dietz and Shwom 2007).

120

Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change is the one most
prominent factor in increasing ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage of all the
individual actions listed and making them less accepting of doing nothing as a choice.
The same applies for the willingness to support climate change mitigation policies. Those
who believe in the anthropogenic causes of climate change are more supportive than
others to all the policy options and less supportive of doing nothing as a policy option.
The prominence of believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change as a decisive
factor in climate change related environmental behavior of ranchers and farmers is
consistent in all the correlation tests and logistic regression analyses.
The bivariate tests show that believing in climate change as a possible cause of
the contemporary drought in Nevada is positivity associated with the willingness to do all
the individual actions options listed and support all the national mitigation policies
investigated except for doing nothing, where the correlation becomes negative. The
regression analyses show that believing in climate change as possible cause of climate
change increases people support to most of the national policies investigated except for
taxing citizens and pressuring care companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles.
But, connecting climate change to the drought in Nevada does not impact supporting
nothing as national policy to face climate change. On the other hand, the regression
analyses show that believing in climate change as a cause of the current drought in
Nevada does not impact ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in any of the
climate change mitigation actions investigated except for the increasing the insulation at
home and installing the fuel-efficient light bulbs.
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The more people (in this case ranchers and farmers) believe that human activity is
a significant cause of climate change the more they become concerned about its impacts
and are more willing to act individually and nationally to mitigate climate change.
Consequently, making more efforts to communicate the science of greenhouse gases
effect on the climate and clarifying the thin line between what is natural climate change,
and what is anthropogenic climate change help make people more sensitive towards
climate change consequences. Yet, it is important to understand that believing in the
anthropogenic causes of climate change is a function of other things than knowledge
(Table 6-5). Both females and non-conservatives are more accepting of the anthropogenic
causes of climate change than males and conservatives. Neither vulnerability nor any of
its components are determinants of believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate
change.
This agrees with Hamilton (2010) findings. Hamilton (2010) stated that climate
change is becoming more and more a value laden issue disconnected from reality and the
immune to any increase in the amount and quality of climate change related scientific
knowledge. He also stated that the gap between democrats and republicans regarding
their beliefs about climate change has increased from 4 percent in 1997, to 34% in 2008
(Hamiliton 2010).
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Table 6-5. OLS Regression Results Explaining Beliefs Regarding Climate Change
Anthropogenic Causes.
Variable
Intercept

The Model with Separated
Vulnerability Indices (N=383)
4.486
(.436)**

L.V.I.
P.V.
Se
Ad.C.
A
G
P.O.
Adjusted R2
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 10% level.

-.605
(.612)
-.104
(.190)
.016
(.399)
-.000
(.005)
-.513
(.143)**
-1.374
(.147)**
.250

The Model with the Composite
Vulnerability Index (N=382)
4.528
(.381)**
-.178
(.396)

.000
(.005)
-.514
(.143)**
-1.407
(.143)**
.249

Connecting climate change to its impacts or in this case drought affects people’s
risk perception on all risk targets and enhance their willingness to do or support many
individually mitigation actions and national mitigation policies. This agrees with Brody et
al.’s (2007, 90) suggestion that communicating climate change impacts on smaller
geographical scales (downscaling of climate change models) and providing more precise
information on such impacts increase sensitivity to climate change consequences.
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CHAPTER7
CONCLUSION
Vulnerability to climate change as function of physical vulnerability, sensitivity
and adaptive capacity does not impact climate change risk perception and willingness to
engage in climate change individual actions. When it comes to support of climate change
mitigation policies, those who are more vulnerable to climate change are less supportive
of doing nothing about climate change, yet they are also less supportive of costly
mitigation policies that involve taxing gasoline or corporations.
Physical vulnerability or living in a more water stressed area decreases risk
perception only on those risk targets that are close to people (in this case ranchers and
farmers) such as oneself and family, while Se to climate change or more reliance on
agriculture for living increases risk perception on those targets. Adaptive capacity does
not influence risk perception at all. Physical vulnerability and adaptive capacity are not -or at best a weak -- determinant of environmental behavior including willingness to take
individual actions and support national policies to mitigate climate change. Sensitivity
does not impact environmental behavior at the individual level, but it decreases ranchers’
and farmers’ support to climate change mitigation policies that involve taxation.
The fact that vulnerability affects the attitude towards risks such as air pollution
or hurricane, but not climate change may be attributed to the fact that climate change is a
“crescive trouble” (Beamish 2002, 4). “Crescive troubles”, similar to “creeping hazards,”
are those which accumulate and grow over time. People tend to ignore, avoid or
undermine such troubles, until the troubles reach their tipping points and manifest
themselves through acute and catastrophic events (Gordon and Suzuki 1990).
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The most important factor that determines peoples’ risk perception and behaviors
within the climate change milieu is their belief about the causes of climate change. One
other strong factor is the perceived connection of climate change to its possible impacts at
the local level. The more people believe in the anthropogenic causes of climate change
and the more they connect the weather extremes they encounter in their environment to
climate change, the more they perceive climate change risk, and support taking actions to
mitigate it. Political orientation is another important determinant, as it affects peoples’
risk perceptions and behaviors either directly, or indirectly through affecting their beliefs
regarding the causes of climate change. Other factors such as age and gender impose less
consistent impacts compared to political orientation and beliefs.
Among the U.S. citizens, there is substantial disagreement regarding the reality
of climate change and its potential impacts, and thus, there is highly uneven support for
climate change mitigation policies. Such disagreement stems primarily from variations in
the values, beliefs and worldviews prevailing among the U.S. general public. For any
effective communication of climate change science, there is a need for reestablishing
climate change as a scientific and environmental reality that does not belong to a certain
political or ideological agenda.
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APPENDIX 1
CLIMATE CHANGEVSURVEY FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS

Fallon, Nevada. Example of a Great Basin Curvilinear
Petroglyph etched into a rock about 2-3000 years ago.
The abstract form indicates that the artist had a
Sophisticated artistic sense. People who lived here
fished and hunted in Lake Lahontan, which is now dry.
(Source: http://www.jimpowers.com/ptrglph4.htm)
The purpose of this survey is to gather information on the perspectives Nevada ranchers and
farmers regarding climate change. The reason that we are conducting this survey is to help
researchers in our National Science Foundation-funded research project at UNLV, UNR and DRI,
as well as natural resource managers in Nevada, better understand Nevada’s ranchers and
farmers’ perceptions of climate change. This will aid researchers and managers in understanding
how to best connect with Nevada ranching and farming communities regarding climate change.
This is why this survey asks about your concerns, perceptions, and knowledge. The survey will
take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The responses you provide are very much
appreciated, and will be kept confidential. Should you have any concerns about the way the
survey has been conducted, please contact Dr. William James Smith, Jr. at the School of
Environmental and Public Affairs at UNLV at bill.smith@unlv.edu and (702) 895-4440, or
contact the UNLV Institutional Review Board at OPRSHumansubjects@unlv.edu and (702) 8952794.
Thank you very much for your time and effort during this busy holiday season!
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Demographic Information
This section assesses the participant’s basic demographic information.
1. Age ______
2. Gender
Female
3. Marital status
Single
Widowed

Male

Married

Divorced

4. Closest two roads that cross near your home (otherwise, please provide a 9 digit zip code).

_____________________________________________________________________
5. Closest two roads that cross near your ranch/farm (otherwise, please provide a 9 digit zip
code).

_____________________________________________________________________
6. Education level
Middle school
Some college

High school diploma or GED
2-year college degree
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4-year college degree
Advanced professional degree such as MD or JD

Master’s degree
Doctoral degree

7. If married, please indicate the education level of your spouse.
Middle school
High school diploma or GED
Some college
2-year college degree of GED
4-year college degree
Master’s degree
Advanced professional degree such as MD or JD
Doctoral degree
8. Type of agricultural activity.
□ Farming
Ranching
□ Both
Others including
______________________________________
9. Type of livestock. Please check all applicable and estimate totals as best as possible.
□ Cattle
total#__________
Horses
total#__________
□ Chicken
total#__________
Pigs
total#__________
□ Sheep
total#_________
Turkey
total#__________
□ Others such as _________________________________________________
total#____________
10. Type of vegetable farming activity. Check all that apply.
For sale for human consumption
Food for your own livestock
family

For sale as livestock feed
Food for yourself and/or your

11. Total area of farming land (in acres) _______________.
12. Total area of grazing land (in acres) _______________.
13. Please, as best as you can, indicate the percentage of your ranch/farm’s annual income that
comes from livestock/ranching.
□ 0-.9%
1-9%
10-19%
□ 20-29%
30-39%
40-49%
□ 50-59%
60-69%
70-79%
□ 80-89%
90-99%
100%
14. Please, as best as you can, indicate the percentage of your ranch/farm’s annual income that
comes from growing crops.
□ 0-.9%
1-9%
10-19%
□ 20-29%
30-39%
40-49%
□ 50-59%
60-69%
70-79%
□ 80-89%
90-99%
100%
15. Ranch or farm net income per year (after expenses).
□ $0-25,000
$25,001-50,000
□ $100,001-150,000
$150,001-200,000
□ $300,001-400,000
$400,001-500,000
□ $600,001-700,000
$700,001-800,000
□ $900,001-1,000,000
More than $1,000,000
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$50,001-100,000
$200,001-300,000
$500,001-600,000
$800,001-900,000

16. If the household income is different from the ranch/farm’s income, please, as best as you can,
estimate the total net household income within the following ranges.
□ $0-25,000
$20,001-50,000
$50,001-100,000
□ $100,001-150,000
$150,001-200,000
$200,001-300,000
□ $300,001-400,000
$400,001-500,000
$500,001-600,000
□ $600,001-700,000
$700,001-800,000
$800,001-900,000
□ $900,001-1,000,000
More than $1,000,000
17. Number of household members ___________.
18. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) ___________.
19. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) working on the
ranch/farm_________.
20. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) having other jobs____. Check all
that apply, including spouse.
□ Agriculture and related industries
o Farming to provide food for family
o Farming commercially
o Forestry and logging
o Fishing commercially
o Hunting and fishing are primary sources of food for family
o Other ________________________________
□ Private industries
o Construction
o Education
o Financial activities (e.g. banking, stock market, etc.)
o Health services
o Information
o Leisure and hospitality (e.g. hotel, casino, etc.)
o Manufacturing
o Mining
o Professional and business services (e.g. attorney, business consultant, etc.)
o Retail trade
o Transportation and utilities
o Wholesale trade
o Other ________________________________
□ Government
o Federal
o State
o Local
□ Unpaid family worker (e.g. homemaker)
□ Unemployed
21. Political party identification
Republican
Independent
No party/no interest in politics

Democrat
Other party ________________

22. Are you registered to vote in state or federal elections?
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□

Yes

No

23. Political orientation
Very liberal
Somewhat conservative

Unsure

Somewhat liberal
Very conservative

24. What role should the government play in the economy?
A very minimal role
A moderate role

Middle of the road

A very large role

25. Please mark how strongly you feel about the following statement. Property rights should
guarantee the right to do whatever you want on your own land.
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
Consideration of Future Consequences
This section will assess whether the participant is future-oriented or present-oriented.
26. For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you)
please fill-in a "1" on the answer sheet; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you
(very much like you) please fill-in a "5" on the answer sheet. Please use the numbers in the
middle if you fall between the extremes.
Extremely
Somewhat
Neutral
Somewhat
Extremely
uncharacteristic
uncharacteristic
characteristic
characteristic
1-----------------------------2--------------- 3--------------------4-----------------------------5
A) _____I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my
day-to-day behavior.
B) _____I often engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not occur
for 2-3 years.
C) _____I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve
future outcomes.
D) _____I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously, even if the
negative outcome will not occur for many years to come.
E) _____I generally ignore warnings about possible future environmental problems because I
think the problems will be resolved by technology before they reach crisis level .
F) _____My day-to-day work is far more important to me than behavior that has important but
distant consequences.
G) _____My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (e.g. days and weeks) concerns and
outcomes of my actions, letting the future take care of itself.

General Understanding and Perceptions
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This section assesses participants’ knowledge about climate change in order to help us better
exchange information with the public.
27. Recently, you may have noticed that climate change has been gaining increasing attention in
the news. Have you personally listened to, watched, or read reports about climate change?
□ Yes please indicate if mostly TV, Internet, radio, others __________________________
□ No
28. Briefly, assuming you believe in climate change, what do you think are the causes of it?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
29. How high a priority should climate change be to the U.S. government?
Top priority
High priority
Low priority
Not a priority

Medium priority

30. Please evaluate the following statements and give your opinion using the scale below.
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Not decided
Agree
Strongly agree
1------------------------- 2-----------------------3--------------------4----------------------------5
A) ____ I believe that we are in a period of climate change.
B) ____ I believe that climate change occurs naturally over time.
C) ____ I believe that human activity has not been playing a significant role in recent climate
change.
D) ____ I believe that human activity has been playing a significant role in recent climate
change.
E) ____ I believe that human activity has been the only factor that has produced climate
change.
31. Which one of the following statements do you believe is correct?
□ Most scientists think climate change is happening.
□ Most scientists think climate change is not happening.
□ There is a lot of disagreement among scientists about whether or not climate change is
happening.
□ Scientists agree that climate change is happening, and many believe human activities are
playing a significant role in it.
□ Scientists agree that climate change is happening, but many believe human activities are
not playing any significant role in it.
□ Do not know enough to say.
32. Please indicate if you think the following statements are True (T), False (F), or you are
Unsure (U). In sub-sections B through I the statements refer to at least some, but not
necessarily all, parts of the world.
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T = True

F = False

U = Unsure

A) _____Scientists expect global temperatures to rise at least into the near future.
B) _____Scientists expect ocean levels to rise due to climate change.
C) _____Scientists expect more frequent droughts due to climate change.
D) _____Scientists expect problems with food supply due to climate change.
E) _____Scientists expect increases in disease due to climate change.
F) _____Scientists expect mass extinction of species due to climate change.
G) _____Scientists expect heavy damage to forests due to climate change.
H) _____Scientists expect significant damage to coral reefs due to climate change.
I) _____Scientists expect more extreme droughts, floods and storms such as hurricanes due to
climate change.
Concerns and Mitigation
This section assesses the participants’ perceptions of potential conflict due to climate change that
leads to
social, economic and biophysical impacts. Moreover, it assesses their acceptance of adopting
climate change mitigation policies.
33. Using the scale below, please indicate to what extent you are concerned about the following
areas possibly being impacted by climate change in Nevada.
Not at all concerned
Somewhat concerned
Moderately concerned
Very concerned
1--------------------------------2--------------------------------3----------------------------4
A) _____ Economy
B) _____ Ecosystem degradation (e.g. forests, fisheries, wetlands)
C) _____ Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, droughts)
D) _____ Farming livelihood
E) _____ Food availability
F) _____ Irrigation for crops
G) _____Impacts on resorts and other businesses related to outdoor leisure activity
H) _____Impacts on small businesses
I) _____ Impacts on farmers, and people who often hunt and fish
J) _____ Public health
K) _____ Precipitation for crops
L) _____ Residential water supply availability
34. How important is the issue of climate change to you personally?
Not at all important
Somewhat important
Very important
Extremely important
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35. Please use the scale below to indicate how much you think climate change will negatively
impact the following.
Not at all

Only a little

A moderate amount

A great deal

Don’t

A) _____You personally
B) _____Your family
C) _____Your surrounding ranching/farming community
D) _____People in the United States
E) _____People in other modern industrialized countries
F) _____People in least-wealthy countries
G) _____Future generations of people
H) _____Plant and animal species
36. When do you think climate change will begin harming people in your ranching/farming
community?
Never
They are being harmed now
In 10 years
In 25 years
In 50 years
In 100 years
Not sure
37. If you believe that climate change is occurring, please answer this question. In your opinion,
how might climate change harm your family and business? What information might help you
cope?

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
38. What of the following are you willing and able to do about climate change to reduce its
impacts? Please check as many as you would adopt.
□ Increase the amount of insulation in your home to decrease your energy consumption.
□ Install low-energy light bulbs in your house.
□ Plant more trees near your home.
□ Use public transportation more than you do now.
□ Use more fuel-efficient vehicles.
□ Nothing
□ Others
________________________________________________________________________
39. At the national level, which of the following policies and initiatives would you support to
help reduce climate change? Check as many as you would support.
□ Develop renewable energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal.
□ Educate the public, including through schools, on human causes of climate change.

132

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

Impose taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for climate
change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into increased prices of some
goods.
Impose taxes on fossil fuels (gasoline) for climate change mitigation, understanding that
this might translate into higher gasoline prices.
Impose taxes on citizens for climate change mitigation.
Pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles.
Pressuring the U.S. government to ratify international protocols which commit the U.S. to
fast reduction of carbon emissions.
Use market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial emissions.
Nothing
Others __________________________________________________________________

Local Impacts and Concerns
This section assesses the participants’ perceptions and possible exposure to current climate
change impacts. Moreover it assesses the participants’ coping strategies regarding such impacts.
40. Nevada and other states that rely on the Colorado River are facing a severe drought since
2000. Which of the following contributes to this drought in your opinion? Please check as
many as you feel are related to the drought.
□ Climate change
□ Natural variability in precipitation
□ Pollution
□ Over-consumption of water
□ Over-production of greenhouse gases
□ Other causes such as ______________________________________________________
41. Has this drought affected you and your business? If so, then please explain how.

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
42. Has this drought affected your fellow ranchers and farmers in Nevada? If so, then please
explain how.

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
43. Have you noticed the following changes in your local environment? Please check all that
apply.
□ Increased temperature in (check any below)
o Summer
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□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

o Spring
o Winter
o Fall
Changes in fish communities (e.g. decrease of certain fish types or volume)
Changes in forest composition or grazing area (shift in location and health of trees)
Changes in productive hunting seasons
Decrease of certain game animals and/or their predators
Decreases in insect numbers (e.g. for food)
Decreases in snow packs
Earlier melting and runoff of snow packs
Increases in related diseases
Increases in insect numbers or insect related damage
Increased soil dryness
Increased wildfire (frequency or severity)
Less surface water in lakes and rivers
Less water flow from springs
Others__________________________________________________________________

44. If you noticed any of the above, please describe, and explain what you think the causes are.

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
If you noticed any of the above in #43, how do such changes impact you and your family or
others?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

134

APPENDIX 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Std.

Variable
N

Min

Max

Mean Deviation

Vulnerability (L.V.I.)

399

-.29

.46

.12

.16

Physical vulnerability (P.V.)

458

.00

.50

.113

.10

Sensitivity (Se)

425

.00

1.00

.58

.36

Adaptive capacity (Ad.C.)

417

.01

.96

.31

.17

Age (A)

472

21

95 61.78

13.27

Gender (G)

476 1 (Fe)

Beliefs regarding the causes of climate change (CC.B.)

445

Beliefs regarding the causes of the drought (D.B.)

2(M)

1.74

.44

1

5

2.55

1.37

479

0 (O)

1(CC)

.26

.441

Political orientation (Po.O.)

454

0 (O)

1(Co)

.76

.43

Risk perception on oneself (Self)

443

0

4

2.12

1.09

Risk perception on family (Fa)

440

0

4

2.20

1.12

Risk perception on agricultural community (Ag)

443

0

4

2.43

1.19

Risk perception on the U.S. (U.S.)

437

0

4

2.33

1.22

Risk perception on the industrialized wealthy nations

437

0

4

2.18

1.26

Risk perception on the least wealthy nations (L.W.N.)

438

0

4

2.30

1.37

Risk perception on future generation (Gn.)

436

0

4

2.27

1.39

Risk perception on plants and animals or ecology (Eco)

439

0

4

2.26

1.31

Willingness to increase the amount of insulation (In)

479

0

1

.59

.49

Willingness to install energy-efficient light bulbs (E.L.)

479

0

1

.60

.49

Willingness to plant and grow more trees (Tr.)

479

0

1

.53

.50

Willingness to use public transportation more (Trans)

479

0

1

.09

.29

Willingness to use more fuel efficient vehicles (E.Ve.)

479

0

1

.53

.50

Willingness to do nothing

479

0

1

.13

.34

Support of developing renewable energy resources

479

0

1

.68

.47

479

0

1

.33

.47

479

0

1

.15

.36

(W.N).

(R.En.)
Support of education the public about climate change
(Ed)
Support of imposing taxes on industries (T.Ind.)
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Support of imposing taxes on fossil fuels (T.Fu.)

479

0

1

.10

.30

Support of imposing taxes on citizens (T.Ci.)

479

0

1

.03

.16

Support of pressuring car companies to increase fuel

479

0

1

.41

.492

479

0

1

.16

.372

479

0

1

.28

.450

479

0

1

.17

.379

efficiency (Fu.E.)
Support of pressuring the U.S. to ratify international
protocols (Pr.)
Support of using marker incentives to reduce industrial
emissions (Mar.)
Support of doing nothing

Fe means female
M means male
O means others
Co means conservative
CC means climate change
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